University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1987

Frenchtown pulp mill and the Clark Fork River| A case study in
water quality decision making and public participation
Carl Peter Nielsen
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Nielsen, Carl Peter, "Frenchtown pulp mill and the Clark Fork River| A case study in water quality decision
making and public participation" (1987). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers.
2405.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/2405

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT IN WHICH COPYRIGHT
SUBSISTS, ANY FURTHER REPRINTING OF ITS CONTENTS MUST BE
APPROVED BY THE AUTHOR.
MANSFIELD LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
DATE:

1987

THE FRENCHTOWN PULP MILL AND THE CLARK FORK RIVER
A CASE STUDY IN WATER QUALITY DECISION MAKING
AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

By
Carl P e t e r Nielsen
B.S. T h e Evergreen S t a t e College, 1978

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of S c i e n c e
University of Montana
1987

Approved By

5yT!!~~L

Chairman, Board of Examiners

Dean, Graduate School

Date

UMI Number: EP33905

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent on the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMT
piBMninon nuDusnmg

'—

UMI EP33905
Copyright 2012 by ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction

3

II. Chapter 1, The Early Daysr Decision Making
By Crisis, (1951-1962)

12

III. Chapter 2, Expansion in the
"Environmental Decade", Decision Making
by Procedure, (1973-1974)

39

IV. Chapter 3, Backsliding, or
Nondegradation? Decision Making by
Negotiation (1983-1987)

77

V. Conclusion

149

References Cited

161

APPENDIX A

Chronology of Events

162

APPENDIX B

Cast of Characters

165

2

INTRODUCTION

On November 14, 1986 the Montana Board of Health and
Environmental Sciences holds a public hearing concerning a
wastewater discharge permit for a large pulp and paper mill
in Frenchtown, Montana.

The hearing is an exceptional event

in the record of environmental issues in Montana.

It is

unusual not so much because of the type of issues or parties
involved, but rather because of the manner in which the
issue is brought to a conclusion, and the contrast of this
resolution to previous periods of the pulp mill's history.
********

Twenty nine years earlier, in 1957 the pulp mill
commenced operations in western Montana without the benefit
of a thorough public review pertaining to water quality and
waste treatment requirements.

Large fish kills in the Clark

Fork River resulted in a vocal expression of public concern,
and the mill's first wastewater .treatment system was
installed.
Thirteen years earlier, in 1973 the mill proposed one
of the largest facility expansions in its history, and the
expansion permit was granted following an intense period of
public review and controversy.

An experimental treatment

system was to be installed to handle increased wastewater
production from the expanded mill.

If it proved to be

inadequate, it was pledged, the system would be replaced
3

and additional water quality degradation would be prevented.
Three years earlier, on November 10, 1983, a hearing
was held by the Department of Health and Environmental
Sciences in Missoula.

The subject was generally the same as

the 1986 hearing, but the atmosphere was markedly different.
Champion International Corporation had

requested

a

relaxation of permit conditions for the discharge of
wastewater from the Frenchtown mill, in order to avoid the
replacement of the failed experimental treatment system.
Over 300 people crowded elbow to elbow into the Missoula
City Council Chambers to protest the plan and speak on
behalf of the Clark Fork River and Lake Pend Oreille, into
which the Clark Fork drains.

Busloads of citizens arrived

from as far away as Sandpoint, Idaho.

Many more were turned

away4> unable to reach the doors of the Chambers.
During the three year interval between the 1983 and
1986 hearings the issue received a great deal of scrutiny.
Extensive studies were conducted to assess the impact of the
pulp mill's pollution.

A basin-wide citizens group was

formed to stimulate efforts to protect the river and lake.
Numerous public hearings, meetings and forums were held.

A

special Technical Advisory Committee was formed to help
design the studies and advise the state agencies regarding
their results.

Most importantly, an extraordinary level of

communication was established between the parties, and an
atmosphere of guarded respect and trust eventually replaced
4

one of suspicion and controversy. It was not an easy
process, and it was certainly not always harmonious. But the
end result was remarkable.
At

the 1986

hearing, the Board

of Health and

Environmental Sciences heard about two hours of testimony
and discussion.

All the parties were there - the mill's

owners, conservation groups, state and federal agencies.
But this time all parties were in agreement.

The Board

listened as various organizations, agencies, associations
and the industry presented testimony in support of the
company's new proposal for permit modifications. Not one
dissenting voice was heard.
Many members of the Board and audience were astounded.
One Board member termed the event "refreshing". Another
stated that, in his opinion, "we had better hurry up and
approve this thing before somebody changes their mind".
Others wondered if future controversial issues could somehow
be resolved in this same fashion.
********

Decision-making for water quality permit issues in
Montana follows much the same policy format as in any other
state.

The responsible agency, in this case the Montana

Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, makes a
tentative decision based on the request of the proposed
discharger.

A preliminary assessment is made to determine

if that decision may constitute a significant action

affecting the human environment.
the tentative decision.
by the public.

The public is notified of

A public hearing may be requested

If substantial questions are raised

concerning potential effects on the human environment an
Environmental Impact Statement is required, along with its
attendant public involvement requirements.

At this point,

the responsible agency may make its final decision, based on
the alternatives analyzed and the input of others.

This

decision may then be appealed to the agency's oversight
body, in this case the Board of Health and Environmental
Sciences.
In making its decision, the Department is charged with
the responsibility to uphold the laws, regulations and
standards of the state and to respond to the discharger's
request and public concerns. Upon appeal of that decision,
the Board is responsible for weighing and balancing the
interests of conflicting factions and arriving at a decision
which is in the best public interest.
Frequently, environmental issues in this state are
highly controversial and confrontational.

There is often

little communication between the involved parties outside of
official channels and the news media, and even less mutual
respect or trust.

Conservation groups and the industry tend

to stand off in their respective corners and take their best
shot at each other and at convincing the responsible agency
that their position is the right one.
6

The agency, or the

Board, is stuck in the middle, trying to make sense out of
highly complex and technical issues and make the right
choice.

When they reach their final decision, they are in

the somewhat awkward position of declaring their position to
be in the public interest, when in fact their findings may
not closely resemble the solution originally proposed by any
of the contestants.
The Frenchtown pulp mill opened in 1957, and the issue
of wastewater treatment and water quality in the Clark Fork
River has raged, on and off, since the very beginning.
Issues have come and gone, and
attained in a variety of ways.

resolutions have been
But at no time until the

most recent episode has the public played such a clear role
in the decision-making process in cooperation with the
industry and agencies.

At no time has the conflict

resolution been mediated by the public and the industry
themselves, rather than relying on the state government to
play that role.

This case

study

examines

the role of

public

participation in water quality decision making at the
Frenchtown pulp mill from 1951 to 1987, focusing

on three

distinct time periods in that 36 year history:

1951-1962 - During this time period the construction of
a pulp mill was heavily promoted by boosters, and the
7

Waldorf Paper Company opened the Frenchtown mill in
1957.
and

Permitting and siting requirements were minimal,
water

pollution control requirements were

nonexistent or not enforced.

The role of the public in

decision making regarding water quality protection was
ill defined.

The strongest public role was evidenced

by a spirit of advocacy among pulp mill backers.

When

inadequately treated wastes from the mill resulted in
fish kills in the Clark Fork River many sportsmen and
conservation interests responded with bitter criticism.
A form of decision making by crisis resulted in the
installation of waste treatment facilities, but only
after severe impacts to the Clark Fork resulted in
howling protests by the public. This turn of events,
coupled with air pollution and odor problems from the
mill, got the pulp mill off on the wrong foot with the
public in western Montana.

Much of the public distrust

and bitterness lingers 30 years later.

1973-1974 - During this interval the Frenchtown Mill
underwent the largest expansion in its 30 year history.
An extensive set of new pollution control and
environmental review laws were fresh on the books, and
the public pursued their application with great vigor
and zeal. It was the heyday of environmental activism,
as critics thoroughly analyzed and challenged each and
8

every aspect of the proposed pulp mill expansion.
Concerned citizens organized into a technically capable
organization to address air and water quality issues
related to the mill's expansion.

The public's role in

the decision making process was well defined by
statute, but key government agencies allowed such
participation grudgingly.

They seemed reluctant to

surrender their authority by opening their decision
making process to public concerns and suggestions.
Conservation interests responded by participating in a
highly adversarial manner, using every conceivable law
and regulation to throw roadblocks into the path of the
expansion, and questioning the competence of government
officials.

There was little effort by any faction of

the public, industry or natural resource agencies to
reconcile differences in opinion or resolve conflicts.
As a result, when the expansion permit was granted
there was little agreement that water quality resources
would be protected.

1983-1987 - During this period the pulp mill requested
permission for a liberalized waste discharge permit.
The proposed changes would allow the mill to avoid the
replacement of a failing treatment system which was
promised to solve additional waste handling needs
during the expansion of the 1970's.
9

When state

pollution control authorities prepared to routinely
approve the increased discharge, 27 years of festering
pubic discontent over water pollution at the mill
exploded in the form of a basin wide protest.

Public

participation requirements were well defined by
statute, but agency actions repeatedly limited such
involvement or

failed

to respond

to legitimate

concerns.

On the other side of the issue, many people

began

blow

to

the issue out of

proportion and

unreasonably blame the pulp mill for most of the
river's pollution problems.

In 1986, an extraordinary

set of circumstances led to a conflict resolution
regarding permit limitations for the pulp mill.

For

the first time in 30 years of controversy at the pulp
mill the conservation interests became directly
involved in defining the terms of wastewater discharge
from the mill.

For the first time in 30 years, there

was unanimous agreement on a water quality decision for
this facility, and no dissenting voices were heard at
the Board of Health's public hearing in Helena.

The 1986 agreement and the manner in which it was
reached has attracted the interest of many industry and
conservation groups in Montana.

The approach taken on this

issue has many potential advantages, and some not so obvious
disadvantages.

It is apparent that all interested parties
10

may benefit from a clear and objective analysis of the case
history and the circumstances required for the resolution of
this conflict.
It is worthwhile today to reflect on the lengthy
evolution of the public's role in decision making about the
pulp mill and its effects on the Clark Fork River.

What

level of public involvement has been demonstrated over the
years, and how has this been influenced by the law and the
prevailing social and political climate of the times?

How

has the industries' attitude toward environmental regulation
and public concerns changed since 1957?

Are conservation

interests and industries assuming a different role and
responsibility in the process today, and are they capable of
sustaining that level of involvement over the years?

To

what degree are today's problems at the mill related to poor
planning and public involvement in decisions to site and
regulate the mill in the 1950's?

And most importantly, is

our decision making process well equipped to allow the
resolution of controversial issues like this one, or is it
better suited for perpetuating conflicts?
It is the intent of this case study to address these
questions.

Although the author was directly involved with

the issue during 1986 as Executive Director of the Clark
Fork Coalition, a citizens' group, all efforts have been
made to provide a clear presentation of facts and an
objective analysis of the issues involved.
11

CHAPTER I - THE EARLY DAYS, DECISION MAKING BY CRISIS
(1951-1962)
The Montana Chamber of Commerce, Montana Planning
Board, Montana State Board of Health, the U.S. Forest
Service and

the U.S. Public

Health Service began

investigating the feasibility of establishing a new pulp and
paper industry in the state of Montana in the early 1950's.
It was recognized that Montana's forest lands

and existing

lumber mills provided an adequate resource to support such
an industry.

But it was also recognized that pulp mills in

other parts of the country had caused the pollution of the
streams on which they were located.

The organizations

prepared two reports in 1951 and 1955 on prospective pulp
mill sites in relation to the water quality of

the

Yellowstone, Missouri, Clark Fork, Flathead and Kootenai
Rivers.

Although little useful information was available to

the investigators regarding water quality and aquatic life
in the streams in question, suitable sites were selected on
the Missouri, Flathead, Kootenai and the Clark Fork.
The investigators used a 200 ton per day (TPD) pulp
mill as an example in their analysis, and determined that
such a mill would not reduce dissolved oxygen concentrations
in the Clark Fork River below those considered adequate for
the propagation of fish.

In reference to the Clark Fork

River site near Missoula, the report stated:
"It is believed that a 200 ton kraft pulp mill could be
12

established in this sector without particular harm to
other uses of the water. There is a considerable
quantity of organic waste presently being discharged
into the stream at Missoula.

Although an attempt has

been made to take this into consideration in making
this estimate, it is extremely desirable that the
actual effect of these wastes be determined by means of
a stream survey before the plans for any proposed pulp
mill in this area progresses beyond preliminary
planning."
"It is probable that there will be very little, if any,
effect on the desirable fish populations. Noticeable
effect on the appearance of the stream will be limited
to a relatively short sector below the mill waste
outlets." (U.S. Public Health Service, et. al., 1955)

The Montana Board of Health attached an interesting
discussion to the first site report, in 1951:

"Our present laws in Montana require that a stream not
be polluted to such a point that it will affect the
health of the people. The law does not attempt to
protect any other water uses such as the use of water
for irrigation, for other industries, or for fish and
wildlife. Before such industries do settle in Montana,
we should have adequate legislation to properly protect
13

our streams, since, if we do not have it before the
plants are constructed, undoubtably some legislation
will come shortly after they are in operation. This
would be very unfair to any industry which might come
into

the state, since

that industry would have

constructed that plant under our present inadequate
laws and then probably find that it was necessary to
make very costly changes in their plant which could
have been made at a minimum cost if the legislation had
been

on

the

books

at

the

time

the

plant was

constructed.
"It is hoped that those interested in obtaining
additional industry in Montana will recognize the
necessity for proper legislation at this time, rather
than waiting until the streams in Montana have been
damaged before corrective measures are instituted."
(U.S. Public Health Service, et. al., 1951)

The 1955 site report, which included the recommendation
for

a site on the Clark Fork

below Missoula, also

recommended that complete stream surveys be conducted as a
part of future planning to determine existing physical,
chemical and biological factors that would be affected by a
pulp mill discharge.
The authors also stated that:

14

"Montana and Idaho have a valuable asset in their cold,
clear waters from snow capped mountain areas. These
waters are already utilized for the benefit and
enjoyment of both the citizens and visitors to the
States. Accordingly, the essential problem is to
conserve to the fullest extent possible the values of
these waters for all purposes."

PROMISES, PLEDGES, PERFORMANCE

The Frenchtown pulp mill opened in mid-November, 1957
under the ownership of Waldorf Paper Products and Hoerner
Boxes.
The mill's construction was heavily promoted

by

boosters, including several local and statewide economic
development interests.

One of the strongest backers of the

mill was the State Planning Board, under the leadership of
Director Perry F. Roys.

During the mid-1950's the Planning

Board unabashedly promoted new industries.

Their letterhead

motto read "Montana, Frontier of Industrial Development."
Their objective was "To further the development of Montana
for the economic and social advancement of the people of the
state."
The Planning Board was one of the co-sponsors of the
1955 survey of pulp mill sites, including the Clark Fork
below Missoula.

The results of these surveys, which were
15

admittedly based on very limited data for the streams
surveyed, were presented at public meetings throughout the
region, including Missoula, St. Regis, and Kalispell.

The

purpose of these meetings was clearly not to solicit public
input or concerns, but to provide information to "sell" the
public on the virtues of new industrial activity.
Much of the promotion was the responsibility of Perry
F. Roys.

Waldorf Paper Company officials rarely appeared in

public to discuss their plans in advance of the mill's
construction.

A search of newspaper accounts from the

period show no direct evidence of company pledges to protect
the water quality of the Clark Fork River.
But Perry Roys and other boosters, including the local
Chamber of Commerce, apparently received much information
about the proposed facility from Nels Sandberg, Executive
Vice-President of the Waldorf Paper Products Company.

These

individuals made numerous promises and pledges to civic
clubs and groups prior to the opening of the mill.

Examples

of these commitments, attributed to Mr. Perry F. Roys in
1956, include;

"The (Waldorf) plant operation would be practically a
closed cycle with introduction of wood products and
chemicals controlled throughout the process within the
plant."
"Because of the modern design of the plant, air and
16

water pollution will be held to a minimum."

Montana Fish and Game Department Superintendent of
Fisheries, Walter M. Allen, described the situation in this
way to the Montana Fish and Game Commission on August 28,
1958, " We were given a pep talk by the Chamber of Commerce,
the State Planning Board, and the U.S. Forest Service for
timber products use and also the University of Montana,
Forestry Division in favor of paper mills in Montana. We
actively raised our objections; however, the pilot paper
plant with assured closed system operation was proposed by
the Waldorf Paper Company to be at Missoula below the
Bitterroot River."
Despite assurances from boosters that water pollution
would be effectively controlled at the plant, no wastewater
treatment facilities were installed before the mill opened.
The regulatory climate associated with the construction of
this facility was weak, in fact practically nonexistent.
There was little official review of the proposed facility's
plans prior to construction, and no mechanism provided in
the law for enforcement of water quality standards.
The first six

months

of

plant

operation were

characterized by Waldorf engineers as a period of shakedown.
Production of pulp was erratic, with periods of startup
interrupted by shutdown episodes required

to maintain

equipment. When the plant was in operation there were
17

periods of excessive waste discharge and very little control
of the type of materials disposed in the Clark Fork River.
The black liquor recovery system was inoperable, and these
wastes which the company planned to recover and burn were
discharged directly to the Clark Fork.

The original

blueprints for the plant included an extensive settling
lagoon system and a distribution pipe across the river to
allow the dispersion of wastes upon discharge.

These plans

and specifications were to have been approved by pollution
control authorities.
The JLagoon system was not constructed until August,
1958. Dumping occurred from a single outfall point, not the
diffuser system originally proposed.
In February, 1958 the Montana Fish and Game Department
reported

the receipt of numerous fisherman complaints

regarding foam and discoloration of the Clark Fork River
below the mill. Large quantities of foam on the river's
surface were reported as far downstream as Superior,
approximately 50 miles from the mill. The Mineral County Rod
and Gun Club and the Western

Montana Fish and Game

Association raised strong objections to the pollution
problems.
In late February, employees of the Montana Board of
Health, Fish and Game Department and U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service met with Waldorf Paper Company engineers at the mill
to discuss the matter of waste discharge to the Clark Fork.
18

The Company was confronted with inquiries concerning their
performance in the area of waste treatment, and how this
compared to original plans and commitments.

Explanations

were offered by Waldorf engineers which pointed to numerous
unforseen complications in the construction and operation of
the mill.

Board of Health and Fish and Game Department

representatives Don Willems and John Spindler pointed out in
a February 24 memorandum to the Board of Health that, "no
commitments of action were made by any party in attendance
at this meeting: only suggestions were made." In their
report to the Board, Willems and Spindler concluded that,
"the administrators and managers of the Waldorf
Company are basically honest people with the express desire
to uphold their verbal agreements and commitments made to
the public and to the various conservation agencies prior to
their establishment in Montana. It is felt that any orders
issued at the present time would be most antagonistic to the
Waldorf Company considering the many problems which have
presented themselves and which have been unanticipated by
Waldorf and that they should be given time to work on their
waste treatment system since very little, if any, damage is
being done directly to the aquatic life at present.
However, it is suggested that a limit of five months be
allowed for this work. That is, their waste disposal system
should be installed and operating satisfactorily by August
1, 1958."
19

While pollution control biologists believed that the
direct discharge of pulp mill effluent was causing little
damage to the river during the winter and spring

of 1958,

they believed that problems could arise during the low flow
months of summer. At these times the heavy organic loads of
mill effluent could combine with low flows and high river
temperatures to cause severe depletion of oxygen in the
river water, and possible effects on aquatic life. This was
the principle reason for Willems and Spindler's
recommendation that the mill be required to install their
treatment facilities before August 1, 1958.
Unfortunately, this was not accomplished.
During mid-July, 1958, Department of Fish and Game
investigators noted changes in populations of aquatic
organisms below the pulp mill.
known to

be sensitive

to

Species of aquatic insects

pollution were found

in

considerably less abundance than in 1957, before mill
operation (Whitney and Spindler, 1959). It was a sign of
things to come.
On the evening of July 31, 1958, anglers along the
Clark Fork near Ninemile, downstream of the pulp mill,
reported

large numbers of dead fish

in the river.

Concentrations of dead

trout, whitefish, suckers and

squawfish were found

in backwater areas for 25 miles

downstream.

Evidence gathered

by the Fish and Game

Department pointed to unknown toxic elements in the effluent
20

as the cause of the fish kill, rather than low oxygen levels
in river water. Sampling of the river following the kills
revealed that game fish populations were essentially removed
from the 25 mile stretch below the mill's discharge (Whitney
and Spindler, 1959).
Sportsmen reacted to the fish kill with anger. The
Montana Fish and Game Department concluded that the pulp
mill was the cause of the fish kill, based on instream
surveys and tests conducted on live fish in cages below the
mill's outlet to the river (Whitney and Spindler, 1959).
On August 18 the Missoula American Legion Post held an
open meeting to discuss the fish kill problem.

According to

an August 19, 1958 letter from Dr. Les Pengelly, of the
Montana State University Wildlife Extension Unit, to Walter
M. Allen, Superintendent of Fisheries of the Montana Fish
and Game Department, "Local fisheries men were expected to
be there, but were not notified, so Mr. Sandberg (of Waldorf
Company) and his staff of lawyers, chemists and engineers
were almost unopposed."
Nels Sandberg stated that the "finger of suspicion
points to us because we are the new industry on the river."
He continued to rationalize the problem by stating that he
made no personal promises to anyone that there would be no
water pollution from the plant, and that "Missoula must get
reconciled to industry, if they are going to create jobs,
pay for their schools and raise their children.
21

They have

fish kills all over the country," Sandberg said.
Waldorf officials publicly denied any responsibility
for the fish kills.

Sandberg told the American Legion Post

audience that "We have taken all necessary precautions," but
neglected to state that the originally planned treatment
lagoon had not yet been constructed.
Dr. G.D. Carlysle Thompson, Executive Officer of The
Montana Board Of Health initiated an inquiry before a joint
Board of Health and Fish and Game Department Meeting to
"determine whether the mill operation should be permitted to
continue operation."
Local sportsmen groups expressed anger over the fish
kills, and the lack of action by Waldorf on the commitments
they perceived to have been made by the Company before
opening the mill in 1957.

These same groups, according to

active member Don Aldrich of Missoula, did not oppose the
construction of the mill with any sort of organized effort,
although many members expressed their concerns.

Aldrich

stated, in a 1987 interview, that "Sportsmen were uninformed
and unaware of the potential problems, and mostly exposed to
the opinions of the supporters. The Company had no organized
and technically capable entity to do business with in the
'50's, outside of the Planning Board and the Chamber of
Commerce."

The sportsmen became directly involved only

after the fish kill of 1958. As Aldrich put it, "You have to
take something away to get people to fight."
22

Public response to the fish kill issue was, of course,
not unanimously against Waldorf Paper Company.

There is

ample evidence that many of the mill's strongest boosters
continued to support the company.
editorial, read

A prime example was an

over the air by an announcer on radio

station KBTK on August 29, 1958. The announcer stated that,
"The Fish and Game Commission has been guilty of issuing
ill-supported hysterical statements regarding the plant. We
believe they attempted to pass off to the public a very
minor event as a major catastrophe."
"It seems to KBTK that the Fish and Game Commission is
more concerned with the harassment of a new industry than it
is with its avowed purpose of preserving our marvelous
fishing streams.

Only the very foolish would eat a fish

that had been caught just below the Missoula sewage dump,"
the editorial continued.
"The Fish and Game Commission's senseless rushing about
to keep out all progress from all of western Montana is a
waste of taxpayers money.
"Missoula needs the Clark Fork River for fishing like
it needs an epidemic of smallpox," KBTK claimed.
The Montana Fish and Game Association, a Missoula-based
sportsmen group, contacted the Fish and Game Department
Superintendent of Fisheries, Walter M. Allen, seeking
action against Waldorf.

Dr. Pengelly, who also represented

the sportsmen group, wrote a letter to Mr. Allen stating
23

that, "...the local Fish and Game Association will be
satisfied with the efforts put forth by Waldorf, if they
live up to the promises made to the people of Missoula and
solve the technical difficulties which seem to beset them."
Walter Allen responded by approaching the Montana Fish
and Game Commission, on August 18, 1958, seeking a halt to
the pulp mill's pollution of the river.

The Commission

responded by passing a resolution stating, "That the State
Board of Health and the Pollution Control Council be so
advised that if the condition continues relative to the
pollution of the Clark Fork River, you will ask that the
Waldorf Paper Company be enjoined from operating until
adequate facilities are installed to stop the inflow of
pollutants into the Clark Fork River."
No record has been found by the author concerning Board
of Health action

in response to the Fish

and

Game

Commission's request.
Waldorf Paper Company did not respond to citizen and
agency concerns about their waste disposal until extensive
damages had occurred and it was clear that public and
government response threatened their continued operation.
Promises and pledges were made which were not backed up by
performance.

The Department of Fish and Game and Montana

Board of Health employees held several conferences with
Waldorf Paper to find out why an effective treatment system
had not been constructed.

Explanations were offered, but no

action was taken to solve the problem.
In retrospect, it seems that the situation boiled down
to one of decision-making by crisis.

It was not until the

public became sufficiently riled and motivated by the fish
kill that work began on the mill's lagoon system.

Waldorf

Paper Company initiated the work on their own, without an
order from the Board of Health, in mid-August 1958 — nine
months after the mill began production, after Don Willems'
recommended deadline of August 1, and only weeks after the
fish kill which focused the public's attention.
The public clearly played a role in the resolution of
this problem, but it was not until it became such a
controversial issue that their opinions were respected.
Concerned sportsmen and others voiced strong concerns about
the siting of a pulp mill on the Clark Fork River near
Missoula, but their interests were not incorporated into any
formal decision making process.

Plans for wastewater

treatment were submitted to the Pollution Control Council,
and approved. But there were no public hearings to record
public comment on the issue, no efforts to incorporate those
concerns into planning for the facility, no effective state
permitting authority to control the development and assure
that plans were followed.
The pulp mill got off on the wrong foot in western
Montana. Many citizens in Missoula today find it hard to
fathom how such a facility could ever have been sited in
25

such a location if reasonable planning had occurred—
upstream of such a highly regarded trout stream and one of
Idaho's most pristine lakes, upwind of a growing mountain
community which is subject to stagnant air inversions, and
with hundreds of acres of waste settling ponds in the 100
year floodplain.

The State Planning Board's activities in

the 1950's were in no way related to addressing these public
concerns, but were instead geared toward the promotion of
industry and the downplaying of public concerns.

People

still remember the Waldorf Paper Company's lack of action on
the waste treatment system in 1958.

Thirty years later,

there remains a strong sense of distrust and bitterness
among those who witnessed this episode.

EXPANSION, AND MORE PROBLEMS AT THE MILL

The pulp mill's first major expansion occurred in 1960
with the installation of its first paper making machine and
a bleach plant for producing white paper. These additions
expanded the mill's capacity from 250 TPD (tons per day) of
pulp to 450 TPD of brown linerboard and 150 TPD of bleached
pulp.

Remember that the original planning exercise

conducted in the early 1950's based its assessments of
effects on the Clark Fork on a 200 TPD pulp mill.

This

expansion, much like the initial construction of the mill
itself, seems to have been conducted with little or no
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analysis of its effect on the river, or potential mitigative
measures.
Following the completion of the mill expansion, The
Institute of Paper Chemistry performed "A Biological Survey
of the Clark Fork River in the Vicinity of Missoula, Montana
-- 1960".

It was not until March

of 1961 that the

Department of Fish and Game noted references in this
document which pointed to future waste discharge problems.
The report stated that "Increased water usage as a result of
the manufacture of linerboard, resulted in a general rise in
the level of wastes within the lagoon system."

Since the

lagoons were constructed in 1958, following the fish kill,
there had been no direct discharge of effluent to the Clark
Fork River. The Institute's report continued, "It was
evident at the time of the 1960 study (early September) that
some means of emptying the lagoons would have to be provided
for shortly." (Institute of Paper Chemistry, 1960).
In a Fish and Game Department Office Memo dated 24
March, 1961, biologist Bob Averett pointed out to his
superiors that, "I am not familiar with any proposals by the
Waldorf people to have us allow them put their wastes in the
Clark Fork River. It does seem odd
mentioned in a report such as this.

that it should be
At any rate we should

consider that we have been warned in the event they decide
to dry their ponds some night."
Averett continued, "I would like to ask Art Whitney

(Regional Fisheries Manager for the Department of Fish and
Game) and his people to watch the river quite carefully
during the spring runoff.

I suspect that if they plan to

dry their ponds they will do it at that time. Perhaps I am
being too pessimistic, but I had the "Pleasure" of working
on the first fish kill in this area, and would be unhappy to
see another."
Averett*s comments were at the same time revealing and
prophetic.

It was unusual indeed that the state Fish and

Game Department would first hear about the possibility of
renewed waste discharge from reading a scientific report of
this nature.

His perspective of mistrust toward the company

was expressed clearly, and it is likely that his feelings
were shared by most of the area's sportsmen.

The company

had earned this feeling of mistrust among the public and
resource agencies as a result of their cavalier attitude
toward the installation of their waste treatment system
during their first year of operation.
Mr. Averett had no way of knowing it, but the Company
had apparently learned very little from their previous
experience.

Without seeking permission from pollution

control authorities, Waldorf Paper Company had resumed
discharge of wastes to the river.

The Montana State Board

of Health conducted a routine field investigation on March
31, 1961 and

found

that

the mill

was discharging

approximately 1500 gallons per minute into the river for
28

periods of 3-4 days, and

then holding back on their

discharge for the next 3-4 days.
The Board's Public Health Engineer, Don Willems,
reported that the discharge as conducted during spring
runoff would probably not damage biological life in the
river, so he didn't see any problem with it - even though
the Board had not been consulted prior to discharge.

But

there was actually little evidence to support or contest
this assertion.

The expansion of pulp and paper making

capacity at the mill had been conducted without the benefit
of any review concerning potential effects on water usage
and disposal or impacts on the Clark Fork River.

The

decision to expand was made by the company, with no
opportunity for public or agency review and no analysis of
alternatives for handling increased waste production.
The Board of Health responded in mid-April with a
letter to Waldorf paper suggesting that the company alter
their discharge practices.
"It is recognized that the river may be able to
assimilate large quantities of waste at this time.

It is

advised that this not be done since there is considerable
feeling by the people in Missoula now that the sewage
treatment plant bonds have passed for that city that all
others must keep their wastes out of the stream.
"It is recognized that you have large areas available
for impounding the wastes and it is suggested that you plan

to use those areas rather

than permitting any direct

discharge of wastes from your operation into the stream."
The Board was obviously approaching the issue gingerly.
The Company had made their decision without public review,
and the Board could now only suggest that they alter their
plans, and

advise that the citizens of Missoula were

committed to improving water quality in the river.

It was

essentially the same approach taken in 1958, when the Board
of Health and Fish and Game Department met with the Company
to suggest alternatives.

The approach didn't work in 1958,

and it wouldn't work in 1961 either.
The Company proceeded with their practice of waste
discharge into the Clark Fork throughout the spring and into
the summer.

No analysis was

performed of the potential

effects of increased waste production or alternatives for
waste storage and treatment.

The stage was set once again

for decision-making by crisis.
Bob Averett had made one final, ominous prediction in
his March, 1961 memo when he expressed his reluctance to
work on another Clark Fork fish kill.

To the displeasure of

all, his fears were justified - another large kill occurred
on September 25, 1961.
The Fish and Game Department received complaints of
"large numbers of dead fish in the Frenchtown vicinity" on
September 25 through 29.

Railroad workers sighted "hundreds

of dead fish, discolored water and foam at Paradise" eighty
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miles downstream from the pulp mill and below the confluence
with the Flathead River.

Bill Bush, of the Western Montana

Fish and Game Association, investigated the kills in
response to citizen complaints received at his home, and
found "hundreds of dead whitefish" at Little's Ranch below
Frenchtown, "many more than 50 dead whitefish in the river"
at the railroad bridge at Huson, and at least one dead 3 1/2
pound rainbow trout at Frenchtown.
Fish and Game Department investigators traced the kill
once again to the pulp mill, and blamed it on "an accidental
or intentional spill of toxic pulp and/or paper wastes."

An

unnamed Waldorf representative later admitted privately to
Fish and Game Department officials that a break occurred in
an impoundment dike, through which an estimated 300 to 400
gallons per minute was discharged into the river for 2 to 3
hours, according to Fish and Game internal memos.

But the

company publicly denied any discharge of wastes from their
ponds, blaming the event instead on other possible sources
in Missoula, including the sewage plant.

Nels Sandberg

claimed publicly that only 50 fish were killed, based on his
own count from the bridge near Six Mile, about 10 miles
below the mill.

The company's posture irritated state

wildlife officials, since no evidence of dead fish was found
in the ten mile stretch of river between Missoula and the
pulp mill. Additionally, Department investigators observed
an unauthorized discharge of "dark-colored waste effluent"

from one of the mill's discharge pipes on October 5.
Official response to the fish kill was slow to develop.
In February, 1962 the Board of Health decided to intensify
their efforts to determine the potential effects of pulp
mill effluent dumping in the river. A pollution control
specialist was sent to the pulp mill for an unannounced
visit to collect samples of wastes from the mill's lagoons.
The samples would be used in a special bioassay test to
determine the toxicity of the effluent on aquatic life forms
in a laboratory.

Waldorf Paper Company denied access to the

investigator, claiming that they had concerns over the
research methodology and did not want to cooperate in a test
which could develop inaccurate results to be used against
them.

Although the Board of Health had legal access to the

property, they did not press the issue.
On March 1 , 1962 Mr. C. W. Brinck of the Board Of
Health wrote to Nels Sandberg of the Waldorf Company,
stating, "...., I believe that the . continued use of the
ponds, the use of your sprinkling system, and other
practices which will prevent any direct discharge into the
river should be continued, since we do not want to instruct
you to discharge wastes to the stream unless we had some
idea concerning the safe limits."
This was the strongest directive issued by the Board of
Health since the mill began operation in 1957.
of the letter was clearly advisory, and
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But the tone

apparently had

little effect on Waldorf's discharge plans.
On April 3, 1962 Gene Welch and John Spindler of the
Montana Department of Fish and Game observed a direct
discharge from the pulp mill into the Clark Fork River.
According to an Office Memo from Art Whitney, dated April 6,
this discharge occurred at a river flow of 5,730 cubic feet
per second (cfs) as measured at St. Regis.

Whitney

expressed his belief that the mill should not discharge
unless flows exceeded 10,000 cfs.
On April 16, the Board of Health responded with their
first definitive instructions for waste discharge from the
mill.

According to a letter from Claiborne Brinck, Director

of the Division of Environmental Sanitation, the mill was
permitted to discharge at a rate of 2 cfs

continuously when

river flows exceeded 10,000 cfs, or at a rate of 4 cfs if
Waldorf desired to discharge for three days and then stop
for three days. This letter, for the first time, formally
established spring high flow as the most acceptable season
for discharge.

Waldorf continued to discharge wastes in

excess of the Board's instructed rates for at least three
days following receipt of this letter, according to a Field
Investigation recorded on April 19 by John Spindler.
An April 24 letter from the Board of Health to Waldorf
made some vague changes in the previously stated guidelines
regarding which outfall pipes could be used, and asked for
accurate records of

discharge rates, river flows and pond
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levels throughout the period of discharge.
The author found no record of any public involvement in
the determination of discharge practices and limits during
the period following the 1961 fish kill, and through the
spring discharge period in 1962.

All of the decisions were

made by the Company themselves, sometimes with notice
provided to the state Board of Health and other times not.
The response of the state was consistently to issue
recommendations or vague directives to the company, which
they apparently ignored in many instances.
On April 17, 1963, Board of Health and Fish and Game
officials met with Waldorf representatives to arrive at
procedures for waste discharge during the upcoming spring
discharge period.

The decision was reached to recommend

discharge when river flows exceeded 10,000 cfs, but to allow
as much as two times the volume to be dumped as that allowed
in the previous year.

Waldorf's request to allow discharges

down to 5,000 cfs was rejected. The Board of Health followed
up on this meeting with a letter detailing the procedure and
requesting notification prior to any discharge of impounded
wastes.
This 1963 decision reflected the best professional
judgement of those agencies involved at the time.

It was

the first notable example of the agencies negotiating
discharge practices and limits prior to a discharge season
at the pulp mill.
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Public reaction to the fish kills in 1958 and 1961
contributed strongly to the steady progression towards this
form of negotiated regulation of pulp mill waste discharge.
But it took over five years of problems and exchanges
between agencies and mill officials before anything
resembling a regulatory framework was established.

Still,

the public was not clearly involved with the ultimate
technical discussions and deliberations which resulted in
the negotiated permitted discharges.

********

The United States Congress had passed the Water
Pollution Control Act in 1956, and the first years of water
quality decision making at the pulp mill were influenced by
the guidance and directives of this Act.

It was the first

significant Congressional effort to define the federal role
in water pollution control, and its approach was clearly
very conservative.

The underlying philosophy of the

legislation is demonstrated by its declaration that water
pollution abatement is a "uniquely local problem."

While

the Water Pollution Control Act advocated a "partnership"
between federal and state government in attacking water
pollution problems, the act left the responsibility for
setting standards and enforcing them to the states alone.
This limiting feature of the act was roundly criticized by
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conservationists because it placed no pressure on the states
to effectively control pollution problems.

In the absence

of such pressure, it was claimed, few states would
voluntarily pass strict standards or enforce water pollution
problems.

Many states, like Montana, were anxious to lure

new industry, and hesitant to place themselves at a
competitive disadvantage with their neighboring states.
Water

pollution control and

regulation

at

the

Frenchtown pulp mill was, for the most part, weak and
ineffective during the period from 1957 to 1962.

The state

of Montana and Missoula were anxious to stimulate new
economic development during this period, and reluctant to
discourage this new industry by

enforcing stricter

pollution standards than neighboring states.

Federal water

pollution law did not compel the state to pass or enforce
effective standards.

Public opinion was generally swept up

in a spirit of boosterism during the mill's planning and
siting phase.

Involvement of those who might be affected by

pollution from the facility was generally limited until
severe pollution and fish kills resulted in a form of
decision making by crisis.

At no time during the five year

period was public participation specifically required by law
or regulation.
Not until five full years following the commencement of
waste discharges at the Frenchtown mill did the state engage
in a form of water pollution regulation by negotiation.

The Montana Board of Health and the Water Pollution
Control Council continued to negotiate allowable discharges
with the Waldorf Paper Company each year, prior to spring
discharge.

On April 6, 1965, the Council approved an

increase in allowable discharge from 1,000 to 1,500 gallons
per minute.

Waldorf had requested an increase in allowable

discharge to 2,500 gallons per minute.
In early 1966, the Waldorf Paper Company merged with
Hoerner Boxes to form the Hoerner-Waldorf Corporation.

The

Frenchtown mill underwent its second major expansion, adding
a second paper machine and chip digesters, and increasing
capacity to 1,150 tons per day.

In the spring of 1966, the

Montana Board of Health granted the request of HoernerWaldorf to increase its allowable discharge to the Clark
Fork River.

Before the expansion the mill was allowed to

discharge at a minimum ratio of 50 parts river water to 1
part waste.

Following expansion, permission was granted to

discharge down to a 25:1 ratio.
In 1967, a

Board

of Health Field Investigation

indicated adverse effects on stream fauna below the mill.
The Board of Health's Division of Environmental Sanitation
requested a cessation of discharge in February, and Hoerner
Waldorf complied for a period of thirteen months, with the
exception of high water discharge from storage ponds at
river flows exceeding 10,000 cfs.

In March, 1968, The Montana Department of Health and
Environmental

Sciences,

responsibilities of

which

had

assumed

the

the Board of Health following an

executive reorganization, issued the Frenchtown pulp mill's
first formal wastewater discharge permit.

The permit

allowed discharges of 1,500 gallons per minute between May
1 , 1968 and July 2, 1968. Hoerner-Waldorf did not use the
permit to discharge during 1968.
In 1969 Hoerner-Waldorf installed a primary clarifier
to provide removal of suspended solids from wastewater prior
to storage in its settling ponds.
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CHAPTER 2 - Expansion Occurs in the "Environmental Decade",
Decision Making by Procedure, (1973-1974).

The 1970's have been characterized as a decade of a new
environmental awareness.

A greater recognition of valuable

environmental resources and a growing national commitment to
protect them resulted in the passage of several pieces of
landmark federal legislation, including the Water Quality
Act in 1965, the National Environmental Policy Act in 1970,
and the Water Pollution Control Act in 1972.

The Montana

Legislature followed with the passage of the Montana
Environmental Policy Act in 1971 and the Water Quality Act
in 1967.

Further changes were made through the Water

Pollution Control Act in 1973, to allow state authority to
administer the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) and
capabilities.

to broaden Montana's enforcement

These new environmental statutes, and the

ensuing adoption of procedural rules to implement them, had
a profound effect on the regulation and public review of
water pollution issues in Montana.
The Montana Water Quality Act directed the Montana
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences (MDHES) to
establish a comprehensive pollution control program
involving stream classifications, standards, nondegradation,
permits, training and enforcement:
75-5-101. Policy. It is the public policy to: (1) conserve
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water by protecting, maintaining, and improving the quality
and potability of water for public water supplies, wildlife,
fish and aquatic life, agriculture, industry, recreation,
and other beneficial uses, (2) provide a comprehensive
program for the prevention, abatement, and control of water
pollution.

75-5-102. Purpose. (1) A purpose of this chapter is to
provide additional and cumulative remedies to prevent,
abate, and control the pollution of state waters.
75-5-103. Definitions. ... (5) "Pollution"

means

contamination or other alteration of the physical, chemical,
or biological properties of any state waters which exceed
that permitted by Montana water quality standards, including
but not limited

to standards relating

to change

in

temperature, taste, color, turbidity, or odor: or the
discharge, seepage, drainage, infiltration or flow of any
liquid, gaseous, solid radioactive, or other substance into
any state water which will or is likely to create a nuisance
or render the waters harmful, detrimental, or injurious to
public health, recreation, safety, welfare,
livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or other wildlife.

Under the direction of 75-5-301 the Montana Board of
Health and Environmental Sciences (MBHES), adopted standards
and classifications for Montana's streams.
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The Clark Fork

River below Missoula was classified B-l, as follows:

16.20.618 B-l Classifications (1) Waters classified B-l are
suitable for drinking, culinary and food processing purposes
after conventional treatment, bathing, swimming

and

recreation, growth and propagation of salmonid fishes and
associated aquatic life, waterfowl and furbearers and
agricultural and industrial water supply.

In 1971 the Montana Water Quality Act was amended to
include a strict policy intended to protect all state waters
from further water quality degradation:

75-5-303. Nondegradation Policy. The Board shall require:
(1) that any state waters whose existing quality is higher
than the established water quality standards be maintained
at that high quality unless it has been affirmatively
demonstrated to the board that a change is justifiable as a
result of necessary economic or social development and will
not preclude present and anticipated use of these waters,
and (2) any industrial, public, or private project or
development which would constitute a new source of pollution
or an increased source of pollution to high quality waters,
referred to in subsection (1), to provide the degree of
waste treatment necessary to maintain that existing high
water quality.

The Montana Environmental Policy Act declared a new,
broad ranging state policy of environmental protection,
including the formation of the Montana Environmental Quality
Council, direction

to

state

agencies

to

prepare

Environmental Impact Statements on significant actions
affecting the environment, and

requirements for public

involvement in the preparation of Impact Statements and the
activities of the Environmental Quality Council:

75-1-102. Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to declare
a state policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment, to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment
and the biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of
man, to enrich his understanding of the ecological systems
and natural resources important to the state, and to
establish an environmental quality council.
75-1-103. Policy. (1) The legislature, recognizing the
profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of
all components of the natural environment, particularly the
profound influences of population growth, high density
urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation,
and

new and expanding

technological

advances, and

recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and
maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and
development of man, declares that it is the continuing
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policy of the state of Montana, in cooperation with the
federal government and local governments and other concerned
public and private organizations, to use all practicable
means and measures, including financial and technical
assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the
general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can coexist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Montanans.

Consistent with Article II, section 3 of the Montana
Constitution, MEPA declared:

75-1-103 (3) The legislature recognizes that each person
shall be entitled to a healthful environment and that each
person

has a

responsibility

to contribute to

the

preservation and enhancement of the environment.

Model Rules were later adopted by the Environmental
Quality Council to implement MEPA through administrative
procedures of various state agencies.

These rules further

defined procedures for the preparation of Preliminary
Environmental Reviews and Environmental Impact Statements,
and required access of public organizations and individuals
to such documents and to all written comments received by an
agency.

The model rules further outlined requirements to
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hold

public hearings, provide public notice of agency

decisions and hearings, and to respond to all substantive
comments in their analysis of the environmental impacts of
the proposed action and alternatives to that action.

********

In August, 1973, when the ink was barely dry on this
inspired and comprehensive set of federal and state laws and
regulations, Hoerner-Waldorf Corporation announced plans for
one of the largest facility expansions in its history.
The $40 million expansion would increase mill capacity
from 1,150 tons per day (TPD) to 1,850 TPD, add a new paper
machine, increase air emissions of sulfur dioxide, and
increase wastewater discharges from 15.1 million gallons per
day to an estimated 24.8 million gallons per day.
Despite the increase in total wastewater volume, Mill
Manager Hoy Countryman claimed the actual pollution load on
the Clark Fork River would be decreased.

This would be

accomplished by improvements in spill control within the
mill and the installation of a secondary treatment aeration
basin, which had been mandated by MBHES in 1970.

Countryman

was quoted in Hoerner Waldorf's company newsletter,
Hexiscoop, that "together with changes in mill operation and
water treatment, (the proposed expansion) will not create
problems in the river below our mill, but instead can be
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expected to reduce the probability of problems developing
that would be detrimental to the stream."

PULP MILL SEEKS A VARIANCE

Even before the mill announced its expansion, the first
nine months of 1973 were a period of renewed controversy, as
the Hoerner Waldorf Corporation requested a variance to
permitted waste discharge procedures and the proposal met
with a wall of opposition from another state agency and
conservationists.
On April 25, 1973 Hoerner Waldorf (H-W) wrote to the
Montana Water Quality Bureau (MWQB) pointing out below
average precipitation and snowpack conditions in the Clark
Fork Basin, and forecasting that the mill would be unable
"to release our total volume of stored effluents," into the
Clark Fork River.

The mill's wastewater discharge permit,

issued by the state, allowed discharges from the mill's
settling ponds only at river flows exceeding 10,000 cfs.
H-W Technical Director Larry Weeks wrote, "We consider it
extremely important to empty our ponds completely once per
year, in order to inspect their condition and to perform
required maintenance."

H-W's proposed solution was to allow

"controlled release to the river at a faster rate" than
allowed by the permit.

"Looking to the future," Weeks

wrote, "Hoerner Waldorf expects to avoid any reoccurrences

of this type," due to planned improvements at the mill and
the installation of secondary treatment facilities as
required by the state.
The Montana Department of Health and Environmental
Sciences (MDHES) amended the mill's discharge permit to
allow greater wastewater flow rates and discharge at river
flows down to 7,000 cfs, during 1973.

The Montana Department of Fish and Game
strong objections to the permit variance.

responded with
State Fish and

Game Director Wesley Woodgerd wrote to DHES on May 4,
stating, "It is unfortunate that waste discharge rates must
be increased to accommodate the dumping of the HoernerWaldorf pond sys tem into t h e Clark For k River.

The

inadequacy of Hoerner-Waldorf's waste treatment system was
recognized in 1966 when a member of your staff, Don Willems,
recommended a better treatment system to operate effectively
during low runoff years....

As you know, this operation's

waste treatment has been controversial since the
construction of the plant almost 15 years ago."
On May 8, 1973 The Missoulian newspaper reported that
Fish and Game Departent officials were upset that they were
not consulted by MDHES before the permit variance was
granted, as required by state law. Ralph Boland, chief of
the Fish and Game Environment Bureau claimed, "We're in the
typical position of having the health department issue a

permit without checking with us and then turning their backs
and walking away from the problem."

Fish and Game officials

claimed that the permit variance should have been "tighter",
and required the company to bear the expense of monitoring
the pollution discharge and its effects on the stream.

The

Department was mostly concerned with impacts on oxygen
levels in the river water, and said that they would monitor
the waste discharge themselves to protect the river and its
fishery.
The Montana Wildlife Federation also opposed the permit
variance, claiming that an Environmental Impact Statement
should be prepared and public hearings held.
MDHES Water Quality Bureau Chief, Don Willems, claimed
in an internal Department Memo to his superiors, that the
Fish and Game Department had misrepresented the facts and
gone, "out of their way to try to make us out as 'bad guys'
when in fact we spent considerable effort in reviewing the
situation."

But the attitude expressed by the Fish and Game

Department officials was shared by much of the concerned
public.

The Missoulian editorialized on the subject,

claiming that state authorities were "incompetent", and that
"Montana can enact the most enlightened and tough air and
water pollution control laws; it can pass the nation's
toughest strip mine reclamation laws, and none of all that
means piffle if the bureaucrats fail to administer those
laws effectively."
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The decision made by the Water Quality Bureau to grant
the variance may or may not have been the correct one, but
the questionable way in which they arrived at the decision
drew public criticism and cast doubt on its merits.

State

law required the health department to consult with the Fish
and Game Department, through a liaison provided at Fish and
Game expense. This task was not performed.

And the public

was not consulted either, despite requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act and Montana Environmental
Policy Act to prepare and make public the results of
environmental assessments, and to perform an Environmental
Impact Statement and hold public hearings if substantial
questions are raised about the potential impact on the
environment.
Despite the Water Quality Bureau's careful staff review
of the data and the potential effects of the proposed
variance, the public and other state agencies were not
involved in the decision making process.
An ensuing turn of events clearly demonstrated that
they could have saved themselves much trouble and arrived at
a more agreeable decision had they taken the trouble to
involve other interested parties.
On May 17, several officials of the Montana Department
of Fish and Game, including Jim Posewitz, Boyd Opheim and
Ralph Boland met directly with Hoerner Waldorf to discuss
their disagreements with the terms of the variance.
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As a

result of

that meeting, H-W agreed to restrain their

discharge to periods of river flows exceeding 10,000 cfs, as
originally required by their permit, and to perform instream
testing for dissolved oxygen to assess the increased rate of
wastewater discharge allowed by the variance. If oxygen
levels were found to go below the state standard, H-W would
restrict their rate of discharge.
achieved

without

great

This compromise was

difficulty, through

open

communication of concerns between the two parties.
The Water Quality Bureau's

failure to allow such an

expression of concerns in their decision making process
clearly prevented them from reaching a decision which was
acceptable to all parties involved, and brought considerable
public criticism upon themselves.
This episode set the stage for heightened public
controversy when the DHES Water Quality Bureau considered
Hoerner Waldorf's plans for expansion.

THE OPPOSITION EXPLODES

In September, 1973 the Missoula County Democratic
Central Committee called for a moratorium on growth at the
pulp mill.

In a written statement, the committee said

pollution control equipment was not yet proven, and "It was
felt that the people of Missoula have the right to assess
the effectiveness of present control devices....before
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agreeing to an expansion which would substantially increase
pollution levels."
The Montana Board of Health and Environmental Sciences
had ordered the mill to install a secondary, aeration basin
treatment system for its wastewater by ]^97^) to comply with
the Best Practicable Treatment requirement of the Clean
Water Act.

The company included this new system in its

proposed $40 million expansion.

But the Missoula County

Democrats and many environmentalists were concerned that the
new system should be tested to assure it was capable of
handling the wastes of the mill at its current production
levels, before permission was granted

to allow a 60%

production expansion.
Also in September, a

new organization called the

"Concerned Citizens for a Quality Environment" (CCQE) formed
to address the overall air and water quality issues related
to the pulp mill's expansion proposal.

It was the first

citizen's group formed to focus on the overall environmental
effects of the Frenchtown pulp mill, since the mill opened
in 1957.
Hoerner Waldorf prepared their own Environmental Impact
Statement on the proposed expansion, and submitted it to the
MDHES.

The company selected a panel of experts to prepare

an EIS summary, which unabashedly supported the expansion
and discounted potential environmental effects.

Copies of

this summary were distributed by the Missoula Chamber of
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Commerce to each of their members, with a letter stating
that, "The Missoula Area Chamber of Commerce endorses the
proposed mill expansion plans revealed by Hoerner Waldorf
Corporation on August 28, 1973, providing the expanded mill
conforms to Montana environmental standards as they have
publicly committed themselves to do."
The Concerned Citizens For A Quality Environment began
asking tough questions about the mill's expansion plans.
Has H-W committed tax fraud by purchasing recovery boilers
with tax free pollution control bonds, even though such
bonds were not to be used to finance expansion?

Can the

pond system be expanded in the floodplain without increasing
the hazard of a 100 year flood event?

Will the mill's

filtration of wastes into the ground lead to unlawful
contamination of groundwater?

Should H-W be forced to apply

for a new permit to increase their waste discharge to the
river before they get a permit to expand the mill?

If the

mill's treatment system was not adequate to comply with
their discharge permit during low river flows in 1973, how
can we be sure that the new system mandated by the state to
handle present mill production will be adequate to deal with
a 60% increase in production?
CCQE attracted the technical support of an inspired and
committed group of volunteers, including several professors
from the University of Montana. Never before had the mill's
waste discharge plans been subjected to such a thorough

public review by a technically capable conservation group.
And never before had a citizens' group worked under such a
comprehensive new set of state and federal environmental
laws and

regulations.

This, coupled

with

the long

chronology of controversy over water issues at the mill and
a bitter mistrust of state officials' handling of the permit
variance in 1973, set the stage for the most divisive and
protracted environmental battle in the mill's history.
Things really started to heat up in 1974.
On January 18, the Montana Board of Health and
Environmental Sciences adopted rules to implement the
Montana Pollution Discharge Elimination System, for issuing
wastewater discharge permits.

This step began the process

to allow Montana to assume authority over water pollution
permits from the federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).

This proposed shift in permitting authority came

only 9 months after the publication of federal rules for the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), and
added a complicating twist to the pulp mill issue just as it
was beginning to unfold.

Many people, including the members

of the CCQE, had little respect for the Montana Water
Quality Bureau and its chief, Don Willems.

The poor

handling of past permit issues at the pulp mill, including
the 1973 variance, and the lack of enforcement capabilities
in the Bureau caused

the CCQE to oppose the state's

assumption of the MPDES program.
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This issue would confound

the consideration of Hoerner Waldorf's proposed expansion.
Also

in

January,

investigations of
expansion.

the

CCQE

water quality

intensified
issues and

its

the H-W

An attorney was retained to provide a thorough

analysis of legal issues surrounding the expansion, and the
new avenues of

public

influence enabled

by

recent

environmental legislation, including public hearings and
citizen lawsuits.

By this point in time it was clear that

the CCQE was becoming exceptionally well prepared for the
ensuing discharge permit and expansion permit battles. Its
core group of Clancy Gordon of the University of Montana
Department of Environmental Studies, Ron Erickson of the
Chemistry Department, Robert Curry of the Geology Department
and Gail Owen, a private citizen with an engineering
background, were geared up to scrutinize every detail of the
mill's proposals on both a technical and legal basis.
Citizen involvement had truly come a long way since the days
of apathy and complacency in the 1950*s.
On February 14 , 1974 the League of Women Voters
sponsored a Public Meeting in Missoula.

The meeting was

held at the request of the Water Quality Bureau, and its
purpose was to allow the Bureau to explain its water quality
programs and the proposed transfer of federal permitting
authority to the state. Things didn't turn out exactly as
planned.

The Hoerner Waldorf water quality permit and

expansion plans were foremost on the minds of those in
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attendance.

It was an opening salvo in what would be a long

battle for the CCQE.
The CCQE's Bob Curry opened the meetings testimony by
grilling Water Quality Bureau Chief Don Willems about
several procedural issues relating to the issuance of the
upcoming 1974 discharge permit.

He asked what provisions

the Bureau planned for a public hearing on the permit, and
Willems responded, "There's none for this coming permit,"
according to typed transcripts of the meeting prepared by
CCQE.

Willems further explained that the WQB expected to

issue a permit for the 1974 spring discharge by the end of
February, and when pressed, indicated that this meeting was
conceived as a form of public input for that permit
decision.

Section 401 of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act allowed state certification of federal discharge
permits, and provided for pubic hearings.

But the Water

Quality Bureau's plans to shortcut that process, take public
input in a meeting sponsored for a different purpose, and
issue a decision only two weeks following the public meeting
caused more consternation among the CCQE.
Bob Curry summed it up by stating, "there is some lack
of faith among members of the public about the ability of
the Bureau to carry out water pollution control programs
under existing laws and regulations."
When asked if the Water Quality Bureau would consider
denying a discharge permit to Hoerner-Waldorf, Willems said,
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"you'd have to have a good reason."
"A violation of the law isn't a good reason?", asked
Curry.
"Would you say there's a serious violation?", asked
Willems.
"You're trying to put degrees on violations of the
law." Curry retorted, "The

law is utterly immune to

degrees."
CCQE representatives Curry and Ron Erickson detailed a
long list of permit and state standard violations dating
back to at least 1969, including inaccurate or missing data
reporting,

excessive

discharges

of

color, and

misrepresentations of fact relating to phenol content in H-W
permit applications.

Curry cited

internal WQB memos

indicating knowledge that the mill was violating state
discharge permits and standards, and noted that the WQB had
failed to take action.

He stated that H-W had supplied

incomplete data reporting to the state since at least 1969,
and the WQB had done nothing to correct the reporting
problems. Ron Erickson pointed out that H-W had submitted
permit applications containing false representations that
phenols were "absent", despite knowledge that they were
present.

He pointed out that state standards for the Clark

Fork's Bl classification clearly state that phenols shall
not be discharged.

CCQE representatives further explained

that the Montana Water Quality Bureau and the Department of
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Health and Environmental Sciences were ill-equipped with
legal and enforcement staff and budget to administer the
state MPDES permit program.
The Bureau's Abe Horpestad maintained that since the
state Department of Fish and Game had

been unable to

demonstrate toxic effects of the H-W discharge in the river,
phenols discharge from the mill should not be considered a
problem.
The CCQE asserted that the Montana Water Quality Bureau
was ill-prepared to assume authority from the EPA for
wastewater discharge permitting, and that the 1974 permit
should not be reissued until substantive assurances were
given that state standards and laws would not be violated in
the future.
In a March 27, 1974 letter to attorney Jim Goetz, the
CCQE's Bob Curry wrote that the transcript of the February
meeting "presents evidence of statements made by Willems and
his

staff

about

his

inability

to

carry

out

the

administration of his program, his lack of funding, and his
unwillingness to abide by the laws of his own state." He
summed up the CCQE's philosophy by stating, "I think that we
need to use every legal device possible to gain as much time
from Hoerner-Waldorf before issuance of any expansion
permits or dumping permits so that we may be able to gain
information from ongoing and proposed studies about the
impact of the proposed expansion."

The delay tactics employed by the CCQE, and many other
environmental groups across the state on other issues, led
industry representatives to label the conservationists as
"environmental obstructionists".

The CCQE had stated their

position clearly in public, explaining that they did not
actually oppose the expansion, but wanted it delayed until
the company could prove the environment would not be
damaged.

But industry backers didn't buy this explanation,

claiming that the environmentalists were a "radical
minority", who sought to limit economic growth and
industrial expansion.

Some CCQE members may have actually

believed in this no-growth philosophy, but the majority did
not and it was not the organization's express policy.

The

pulp mill backers who used the obstructionist label for
environmentalists were in fact misrepresenting their
opponents official stance on the issue.

No matter how

strongly they believed that they were right about the
environmentalists true motivations, the name calling did not
contribute to a dialogue between the opposing factions, or
an efficient resolution of the expansion controversy.
The CCQE's position on the H-W expansion sought ct delay
in permissign to expand while air and water pollution
control programs were put in place to insure that all state
and federal standards could be met.

Additionally, on a

philosophical level, the environmental group claimed that if
the mill had the money to greatly expand its mill, then they
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should also have been able to install the best waste
treatment systems available.
Gail Owen, a free lance writer who performed extensive
technical research for CCQE, claimed that numerous other
pulp mills in the U.S. and other countries had installed and
demonstrated more effective air and water pollution
treatment processes than those proposed by the Frenchtown
mill.

Owen told the Missoulian that the mill seemed to view

pollution control, "as though it was a millstone around
their necks," and that they believed, "their potential
profit would be greater if they reverted back 10 years."
"To convey to the public that it (installing better
treatment) can't be done is false, it costs money though,"
Owen noted.

His calculations indicated that installing the

best available air and water pollution controls would
roughly double the $8.1 million

capital costs and triple

the $700,000 annual operating costs for pollution controls
at the mill.
The CCQE's Ron Erickson said, "Do this: give us the
best available technology.
That

will

better

That will meet state standards.

state standards. It's corporate

citizenship."
The CCQE's philosophical position on using the best
waste treatment money can buy was met with much sympathy in
the Missoula community at the time - many people remembered
the promises and pledges expressed by boosters before the
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mill came to town, and remembered the more recent (as late
as the early 1970's) air pollution episodes when the entire
Missoula Valley smelled like a rotten egg.

Despite a common

statement among mill boosters that, "It smells like bread
and butter to me," the vast majority of Missoulians seemed
to not appreciate the stench, and the air pollution issue
became the most popular rallying cry for expansion
opponents.

A separate environmental group, GASP( Gals

Against Smog and Pollution) had formed to fight the air
pollution battle in the late 1960's.
Civil disobedience became a
expansion opponents.

tactic used by the

Protesters from the university camped

across the river from the mill and placed their bodies in
the path of effluent disposal in discharge ditches.
The CCQE collected over 7,200 signatures from western
Montana residents on a petition requesting that the Governor
and Board of Health delay the approval of the H-W expansion
for two years, or until 1) the company is in compliance with
all current state standards, and 2) reasonable assurance can
be given that the expansion will not cause future
violations.
But for water pollution controls, the CCQE and other
opponents had poor legal backing for their claim that the
mill should install the best, and most expensive waste
treatment facilities.

The federal Water Pollution Control

Act directed that pulp mills install the "Best Practicable
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Treatment" by 1975, and such measures had already been
mandated by the state Board of Health in a compliance order,
directing the mill to install the secondary aeration basin
treatment system by 1975.

This system was already a part of

the mill's expansion plans.

The Act further directed that

"Best Available Treatment" systems be in place by 1983, but
these technologies were not defined in 1974 as the mill
expansion was being considered.

And the 1983 deadline would

never actually be met, as it turned out.
On March 12, 1974, the Department of Health and
Environmental Sciences issued a nine month wastewater
discharge permit to H-W, allowing discharges in the coming
spring runoff season.

The permit was issued under the

authority of the Montana Water Pollution Control Act, since
neither the EPA or state had yet initiated the NPDES or
MPDES permit programs.
The next major event in the expansion controversy
occurred on May 29, when the EPA held a pubic hearing in
Missoula regarding

the issuance of

wastewater discharge permit for the mill.

the first NPDES
Since the state

had not yet received approval to assume control of the MPDES
permitting program, the decision making process continued
under the auspices of the federal agency.

EPA provided

public notice of the hearing over one month before the
event, and circulated a 16 page "Fact Sheet" which was
actually a complete draft permit.
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On May 15, Frederick Kreiger, a chemical engineer for
the EPA's west coast region sent a six-page letter to the
EPA's Denver Region headquarters, charging that the proposed
permit was inadequate and in violation of EPA regulations.
Kreiger wrote, "After reading and studying the proposed
permit

I have concluded that the permit will neither

limit the wastewater discharge as stringently as is being
required of comparable pulp and paper mills nor adequately
protect the biota of the Clark Fork River."

Kreiger, who

reviewed similar applications for the EPA region 10,
prepared a list of eight areas of deficiency in the proposed
permit, including lack of control over waste disposal by
seepage from the mill's ponds, and loose restrictions on the
discharge of total suspended solids (TSS) and biochemical
oxygen demand (BOD).
Kreiger's letter was an unusual expression of intraagency criticism, and the move certainly created some hard
feelings among the EPA Region 8 staff whom he criticized.
Bob Burm, head

of the Region 8 engineering staff took

exception to Krieger's criticisms in a May 23 , 1974
Missoulian article.

But Burm acknowledged one major error

in calculating allowable discharges of TSS, and attributed
the error to the misplacement of a decimal point showing
that the mill had discharged 12 million pounds of TSS in
1971, instead of the amount they actually discharged, 1.2
million pounds.

Based on this error, Burm said, the EPA
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proposed allowing a discharge of 5.96 million pounds per
year.

Kreiger maintained that allowing such an increase in

discharge of TSS or BOD would result in stream degradation,
and be in violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, which state that "The purpose of
this Act is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."
Krieger's criticisms added

fuel

to the fire of

controversy over the permit issue, just two weeks before the
EPA's public hearing.
The CCQE began to focus on the issue of designing the
new permit to meet the need of the expanded mill prior to
approval of the expansion itself.

The organization's

written comments to the EPA regarding the NPDES permit
proposal stated, "As both EPA and the Montana Department of
Health are well aware, Hoerner Waldorf must procure a
construction permit through the Montana Air Quality Bureau
prior to any construction.
that the approval

Unless EPA takes the position

of Hoerner Waldorf's proposed

expansion is simply a rubber stamp it should not issue a
five-year water discharge permit based on an assumed
expanded capacity.

Clearly if Hoerner Waldorf's expansion

does not materialize, the 2,850,000 lb. BOD yearly
"limitation" becomes a generous license to pollute."
The EPA's Bob Burm told

the Missoulian, "We are

presuming that it (the expansion) will be approved," but he
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did not think this amounted to an EPA endorsement of the
expansion.

"If the expansion is turned down... any permit

would have to be revised," he said.

But Burm failed to

explain that the permit could also be written based on
current production levels, and
expansion was approved.

then revised when the

This procedure would have resulted

in effluent limitations based on a mill production of 1,150
tons per day instead of 1,850, and would have certainly
caused less consternation among environmental critics.

But

the EPA stuck to their guns on the issue stubbornly, and the
proposal gained bureaucratic inertia.

If the EPA had wished

to intentionally provoke its critics, it could not have done
it any better than this.
At the May 29 hearing, the CCQE's Ron Erickson seized
on this issue, pointing out that the language of the permit
application reads, "Any anticipated facility expansions,
production increases, or process modifications which will
result in new, different, or

increased discharges of

pollutants must be reported by submission of a new NPDES
application, or

if such changes will not violate the

effluent limitations specified in this permit, by notice to
the permit issuing authority of such changes."
The Montana Department of Fish and Game also opposed
the proposed NPDES permit, because, "...in our opinion,
greater damage to the aquatic resources of the Clark Fork
River will result under the permit stipulations as written."
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The Department urged that 10,000 cfs river flow be used as a
cutoff for wastewater discharges, as proposed by EPA, and
that the permit limitations be based on the mill's present
capacity with secondary treatment, that ponds should be
sealed to prevent uncontrolled disposal of wastes through
seepage, and numerous other recommendations.
The Department's letter to the EPA made the first
known reference to the potential problems of excessive
nutrient additions in the mill's new secondary treatment
system.
added

In this system, nitrogen and phosphorous would be
to the aeration basins to promote the growth of

organisms which would help break down the mill's waste
before discharge to the river.

The Department of Fish and

Game pointed out that the proposed permit made no reference
to allowable concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorous in
the river, and that no baseline data was available to assess
the effects of the mill's new nutrient additions.

This very

issue would become perhaps the most important single factor
in the permit controversy 12 years later, in 1986.
On June 10, the EPA officially transferred wastewater
permit authority to the state of Montana under the MPDES
program.

THE MILL EXPERIMENTS WITH RAPID INFILTRATION

Beginning in December 1973 and January 1974, Hoerner
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Waldorf had begun to test a new form of waste treatment
called rapid infiltration.

The system involved the disposal

of mill effluent into the soil and upper groundwater, and
eventually the river, through filtration basins which were
separate from their existing 700 acre settling ponds.

The

treatment system was developed under the guidance of
consultant Dr. Al Wallace, of the University of Idaho.

Each

basin was dosed with a load of effluent, which was then
allowed to percolate quickly into the ground, followed by a
period of basin drying to prevent anaerobic soil conditions
which could

cause

the

basins

to

plug and

prevent

infiltration of wastes.
The company installed two experimental basins totalling
just 13 acres in early 1974, and another 20 acres later that
summer.

Preliminary test results based on test wells

downgradient from the basins indicated that over 90% of the
effluent color could be removed by this process before it
reached the Clark Fork.
Rapid infiltration became Hoerner-Waldorf's answer to
its problem of increased color discharge from their
proposed, expanded mill.

Montana's state color standard,

which allowed an increase of no more than 5 "standard color
Units" in the Clark Fork River, had been a problem for the
mill in the past.

During periods of direct discharge in the

spring, and in periods of low river flow, when the mill's
settling ponds continued to seep highly colored material
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into the river, color standard violations were commonplace.
Kraft paper mills like the one at Frenchtown produce a dark,
coffee-colored waste consisting of lignins, solids and BOD.
During 1973, color tests taken by the company during the May
and June discharge season indicated water quality standard
violations in every test, with a maximum increase of twentyone color units in the river ten miles below the mill.

EPA

tests found that the color standard was violated 50% of the
time when the mill was not directly discharging, and the
only wastes entering the river were seepage from the ponds.
The mill had

previously announced that a newly

developed bleaching process, called the Anti-Pollution
Sequence (APS) would be employed in the mill expansion to
remove up to 70% of the color from its highly colored bleach
plant effluent, and that the system would achieve an overall
reduction in color discharge from the mill despite the
expansion.

Although the Frenchtown mill produced only about

150 tons per day of bleached pulp, in comparison to 1,000
tons of brown pulp for linerboard, the bleach plant produced
a higher volume of highly colored waste.

When mill manager

Roy Countryman announced the new system in January, 1974, he
complained about the strict standard while at the same time
praising the new system's ability to comply with it, "To our
knowledge, the present color standard on the Clark Fork
River is the tightest standard in the nation. This new
bleaching process, combined with other mill improvements to

our effluent system will, we believe, allow the expanded
mill to meet this standard." He claimed that the new system
would allow H-W to actually reduce total color from the mill
by 55% following expansion.
The CCQE and

others scrutinized

the company's

optimistic claims about the APS systems during the NPDES
review process.
student at

Jim Carlson, CCQE volunteer and graduate

the University of

Montana Department of

Environmental Studies, performed studies on color from pulp
mills in the U.S. and calculated that the expansion could
lead to a net increase of up to 23% in color discharges
after expansion.
Carlson also found that at least five pulp mills in th§.
U.S. had already installed a color removal treatment process
using lime applications to collect pollutants, which were
later burned in the plants' lime Wilns.

The CCQE's Gail

Owen presented an extensive literature review to the state
concerning the best available technology for the mill's
effluent treatment, focusing on activated carbon techniques.
Hi_s_ research found that the activated cai-bxxn technique had
been extensively tested and demonstrated excellent results
for color removal in Canada, Japan and other countries.

The

technologies were proven and effective, Carlson and Owen
claimed.

But the cost was higher than the use of the soils

and groundwater in the rapid infiltration disposal system.
It was those high costs that the company sought to avoid.
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A February, 1974 Hoerner Waldorf report entitled,"
Water Quality Control Program

For

Hoerner

Waldorf

Corporation Mill Expansion" stated that "No degradation of
the quality of the Clark Fork River will occur as a result
of the mill expansion," based on a "...combination of
clarification, secondary treatment, plus rapid infiltration,
which will provide further effluent renovation beyond
secondary treatment,..." (Hoerner-Waldorf, 1974).
The Department of Health and Environmental Sciences
prepared a Draft Environmental Impact Statement in June,
1974.

The Draft EIS indicated that the proposed expansion

of the H-W pulp and

paper mill would be based on a

continuation of the practice of effluent ponding, and
elimination of the effluent by evaporation, direct discharge
to the river when its volume exceeded 10,000 cfs, and by
rapid infiltration into floodplain gravels and ultimately
into the Clark Fork River.

The mill's current pond capacity

was 745 acres, and about 15.7 million gallons of effluent
were discharged to the ponds per day.

One-third of the

effluent was discharged directly to the river following
primary and secondary treatment and ten day retention in the
ponds, with the remaining amount either evaporating or
seeping through the pond dikes and bottoms.

The proposed

expansion would increase the effluent production of the mill
to about 21.6 million gallons per day, requiring an
additional 325 acres of ponds (DHES, 1974).
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Hoerner-Waldorf had been experimenting with the rapid
infiltration disposal technique since late 1973.

Its

consultants predicted it would be successful, and would
allow the mill to increase their effluent seepage rate from
10 million gallons per day to 20.3 million gallons per day.
The Draft EIS indicated that if rapid infiltration was
not successful, an estimated 6 to 48 per cent of the mill
effluent would be discharged to the river, depending on
river flows and dilution capabilities.

THE STATE HOLDS A PUBLIC HEARING

On August 3 and 5, jjr74_the Montana Department of
Health and Environmental Sciences held a public hearing in
Missoula regarding the Draft EIS on the proposed mill
expansion.

The two day hearing was exceptionally lengthy

and contentious.

Opening statements by the Hoerner-Waldorf

Corporation and its consultants lasted over three hours. The
CCQE reserved nearly six hours of testimony, involving 32
speakers including numerous university professors,
physicians, students, researchers and private citizens.
Hoerner-Waldorf brought in Dr. Al Wallace, a consulting
engineer who developed the new rapid infiltration system
which the mill proposed to use to handle much of the
increased wastewater production following expansion.
On the issue of water quality, Dr. Wallace's proposed
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rapid

infiltration disposal method received the most

scrutiny.

Critics pointed out that there was a paucity of

data available to determine what effect the disposal of 20.3
million gallons per day would
resources.

have on ground

water

There was also considerable concern as to

whether the system would actually work as well as predicted
by the H-W consultant, and what would happen if it failed.
The Montana Environmental Policy Act required that an
Environmental impact Statement include descriptions of, "Any
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of natural and
economic resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.

This requires the agency

to identify the extent to which the action curtails the
range of alternative and beneficial uses of the
environment."
The revised guidelines for Environmental Impact
Statements indicated that, (Item 3.(b)) "If an agency relies
on an applicant for the submission of initial environmental
information, the agency shall assist the applicant by
outlining the type and quality of information required.

In

its own determination on the applicant's evaluation of the
environmental issues, the agency must assume responsibility
for

the scope and

content of

the draft and

final

environmental statements."
The Draft Environmental Impact Statement on the
proposed expansion stated, on page 91, "The anticipated

effluent,...results in an increase of 20.3 mgd (million
gallons per day) to the shallow ground water system or an
increase of 103 percent from the present ground disposal of
10,2 mgd.

The impact of this added volume on existing

ground water" flow pattern cannot be predicted from available
data." (DHES, 1974)
James Carlson, of CCQE, testified at the public hearing
that "This lack of data does not appear to comply with the
revised guidelines of MEPA which require, "A description of
the proposed action including information and technical data
adequate to permit a careful assessment of environmental
impact by commenting agencies and the public."
The DEIS also stated on page 91, "There is also
definite evidence of vertical movement of waste effluent
from the upper shallow aquifer into the deep aquifer.

The

general extent of long-range implications of vertical
interaquifer movement of wastewaters are not known." (DHES,
1974).
Carlson claimed that the_^pollution of the deep aquifer
represented an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of
resources for which there was inadequate information
supplied by the applicant and the DHES to make an informed
decision under MEPA. He asked that the expansion be
postponed for two years or until adequate information could
be supplied relating to groundwater flow patterns and the
impacts of additional ground water disposal of effluents by

rapid infiltration.
Concerned citizens also criticized the Draft EIS"
indication that if the Rapid Infiltration system were to
fail, as much as 48% of the mill's effluent would have to be
disposed of by direct discharge into the Clark Fork River,
up from

33% before mill expansion.

The Draft EIS provided

no analysis of alternatives for the effective
treatment of wastes, including a replacement treatment
system, to handle this contingency.
The DHES published its Final EIS on November 6, 1974,
and issued their decision to grant the requested permit for
expansion without delay.

Over 7200 Missoula Valley

residents had signed petitions requesting a two year delay
while effective pollution control systems were developed.
The Department received 140 written comments on the Draft
EIS, of which 70% opposed the expansion.

The Missoula City-

County Health Department initially requested a two year
delay, but later supported the granting of the permit if
certain conditions were met regarding monitoring and studies
of human health and
emissions.

the relation

to sulfur dioxide

Fifty-two Missoula physicians signed a letter

requesting the delay while the proposed monitoring and
research was conducted.

A telephone survey conducted in the

fall of 1973 indicated 156 persons in favor of expansion,
195 against, and 102 with no opinion.
The DHES dealt with the issue of wastewater treatment,
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and the rapid infiltration system in the following manner:

"If rapid infiltration tests not completely successful
in removing color to meet standards, or if it appears that
domestic wells adjacent to the H-W property will be polluted
with the increased water discharge, an alternate means of
treatment will be required.
"Treatment techniques are available which would allow
disposal of additional wastewater from the expanded mill
without violation of Montana Water Quality Standards.

Rapid

Infiltration will have low operation and maintenance costs
when compared to physical-chemical treatment.
proved

If it is

to be totally or partially unsuccessful, other

treatment means could be installed to allow disposal without
additional water degradation." (emphasis added) (DHES,
1974).

Hoerner-Waldor f's position on rapid infiltration, as
indicated in the FEIS, stated:

"Rapid

Infiltration, combined

with

in-plant

improvements, should allow H-W to meet the color standard
without a large commitment of resources that would be
required to install and operate presently available color
removal systems.

However, should the present approach of

rapid infiltration, APS bleaching and other in-plant
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improvements indicate that this system will not allow the
color standard to be met, further steps will be taken, up to
and including color removal from selected effluent streams,
so that the expanded mill will meet the color standard."

********

Hoerner-Waldorf's Frenchtown pulp mill proposed one of
the largest facility expansion in its history in 1973.

The

proposition came fresh on the heels of a permit variance
controversy caused by inadequacies in their wastewater
treatment system.

The expansion and wastewater discharge

permits came under intense public scrutiny, and
reviewed

within the framework

were

of an array of new

environmental protection laws and regulations.
The majority of pubic response to the Department of
Health and Environmental Sciences Draft Environmental Impact
Statement opposed the proposed pulp mill expansion.
Although water quality concerns were important

to

conservationists, the issue of air quality received top
billing.

Most of the public concern expressed at the public

hearing involved the issue of air emissions, particularly
sulfur dioxide.

Fifty-two Missoula physicians and the

Missoula City/County Health Department endorsed a two year
delay while pollution control systems were installed and
proven.

Of all the criticism received by the DHES on the
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Draft EIS, the comments of physicians and the Health
Department were the only concerns which were directly
addressed in the agency response to public comments section
of the Final EIS.

Instead of requiring a two year delay,

the DHES proposed arant_ina. the expansion permi t . on the
condition that new air quality monitoring and health studies
would be conducted atHoerner-Waldorf's expense.

When the

Missoula City/County Health Department accepted these terms
as "reasonable", the DHES made their final decision to grant
the expansion permit.
The issue of water quality and wastewater treatment was
addressed by a^lowlji^ the company^ to proceed with the
expansion on the /basis) that the new secondary aeration
system, k1?S bleaching, Ln-^-plant spill control and
fr,

the

)•

experimental W^pid infiltration system would allow the
expanded mill to meet the color standard.

Essentially, the

company was allowed to proceed with their preferred, least
cost approach to wastewater treatment at their own risk.
Despite significant public concerns over the pollution of
groundwater resources, the DHES did not require H-W to
provide sufficient data for the Final EIS to assure that no
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of groundwater
resources would occur to curtail future beneficial uses.
Despite significant public concerns over the potential
failure of the experimental rapid infiltration disposal
system, the DHES required no analysis of alternatives to the
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proposed action to address this contingency.

The Final EIS

merely stated that if the rapid infiltration system failed,
an unspecified alternate means of treatment would be
required.

These deficiencies in the Final EIS contrasted

markedly with the requirements of the Montana Environmental
Policy Act.
Following all of the arguments over the mill expansion,
and whether it should be delayed for two years, the
expansion permit was granted in 1974.

Hoerner-Waldorf,

ironically, then made the decision to delay the expansion
until 1976 due to economic factors.
complete until 1980.

The expansion was not

The Frenchtown pulp mill's expanded

capacity of 1,850 tons per day and three paper machines made
it one of the largest linerboard mills in the world.
The mill had proceeded, meanwhile, to build its
experimental rapid infiltration disposal system.

By 1976,

the mill had 120 acres of rapid infiltration basins in
place, handling 63% of its wastewater disposal needs.

Then,

in 1977, the mill first noted that the basins were beginning
to plug.

Initial steps to solve the problem

unsuccessful.

were

In 1983, the progressive failure of the rapid

infiltration system forced the mill to seek an alternative
means to dispose of its wastes.
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CHAPTER 3 - BACKSLIDING, OR NONDEGRADATION? DECISION MAKING
BY NEGOTIATION (1983-1986).
By the time the facility's expansion was complete,
secious

plugging of the infiltration basins was noted by

the pulp mill's technical staff. The "dose - dry" theory on
which the disposal system was based was not proving
workable.

Under this theory, the mill would dose the 120

acre rapid infiltration basins with effluent, and allow
wastewater to percolate rapidly into gravel soils and the
groundwater.

Following each dosing period, the mill would

allow the basins to thoroughly dry, theoretically preventing
conditions under which anaerobic bacteria would thrive.

The

anaerobic conditions were believed to be the cause of
bacterial growths in the basins' soils, which could cause
them to plug.

But despite the mill's attempts to prevent it, the
basins were plugging rapidly.

When operating efficiently in

1976, before expansion, the basins allowed the disposal of
63% of the mill's effluent.

By 1983, the basins had become

so badly clogged that only 30% of the mill's effluent could
be disposed by rapid

infiltration.

The mill tried

mechanical scarification of the basins, even attempted to
open up the clogs with dynamite.

But nothing worked.

The

experimental treatment system which was so heavily touted in
the 1974 expansion permit proceedings was failing.
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On July 22,1,9-82 Champion International Corporation,
which acquired the mill through a merger with Hoerner
Waldorf in 1977, applied for changes to their MPDES
wastewater discharge permit.

The mill requested permission

to discharge wastewater year-round, and to increase the
irc£
PO
allowable disposal of total suspended solids 0(TSS) to
million pounds per year, up from 2 million pounds per year.
Water QualityJBureau Chief Steve Pilcher told
Missoulian that Champion's request would

the

be thoroughly

reviewed, followed by the issuance of a tentative decision.
He said that the Bureau would provide a public notice of
that tentative decision, and if there was enough public
interest the Bureau would schedule a public hearing in
Missoula.

The whole process shouldn't take more than three

months, Pilcher said.
Champion's Technical Director Larry Weeks said that
unless the state allowed the mill to begin discharging
effluent to the river daily, the mill's 500 acre storage
ponds would be full by January, 1984.

As the ponds filled

to capacity, seepage rates would increase causing possible
color standard violations in the river.

"If for some reason

we get turned down, it's going to put us in a bind," Weeks
said.

Failure to solve the disposal problem could result in

higher operating costs and potential production cutbacks at
the mill, he said.
Champion's request drew criticism from
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Richard

Konizeski, a former University of Montana Professor who
served as a consultant to the Hoerner-Waldorf Corporation on
groundwater studies in 1973. Konizeski had predicted at that
time that the gravel basins would eventually clog.
every way I could to make them see the light.

"I tried

There is no

way on God's green earth that anything could happen to them
but plug up," Konizeski stated in an interview with the
Missoulian in August, 1983.

Unfortunately, Konizeski's

contract with Hoerner-Waldorf had not allowed him to make
his results available to the public, or to the state.

The

company had apparently ignored his arguments.
The 1974 Final EIS granting permission to Hoerner
Waldorf

to expand

its mill stated that if the rapid

infiltration system failed, "an alternate means of treatment
would

be required."

The EIS discussed other forms of

treatment, including lime and carbon systems, but failed to
specify which form would be used.

Despite the assurances of

the 1974 EIS, Water Quality Bureau Chief Pilcher told the
Missoulian that he considered Champion's proposal to be a
suitable form of treatment.

"It depends on your definition

of treatment," J^ilcher said, claiming that dilution of
wastes in the river was acceptable as long as .state water
quality standards were met.
On October 10, 1983, the Department of Health and
Environmental Sciences produced a public notice, stating the
Department's intention to modify Champion International's
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MPDES permit.

"The permit modification is being requested

because of a very significant decrease in the capacity of
the rapid infiltration system to treat effluent," DHES said.
The Department made a tentative determination to allow most
of Champion's requested permit modifications, allowing yearround discharge of wastewater to the Clark Fork as long as
river flows were sufficient to prevent state standards
violations, and increasing allowable discharges of TSS from
2 million pounds
The Department scheduled a public hearing for November
10, 1983, at the Missoula City Council Chambers.

A 3 page

Preliminary Environmental Review was provided by the
Department to substantiate its decision.

The document

included a summary of findings, but no specific data was
included to inform the reader of how those findings were
reached.
What happened next came as a surprise to nearly all
observers, on both sides of the issue.
proposal took shape quickly.

Opposition to the

Downstream residents, local

and state governments, sportsmen groups, environmentalists
and the Flathead Tribal Council all came out with a stinging
attack

on

the plan.

The Department of

Health

Environmental Sciences was somewhat taken aback.

and

The pulp

mill permit and others in the state had been routinely re
issued or revised with minor modifications in the past. Why
did this proposal attract so much attention?
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The history of

controversy over wastewater discharges at the mill may have
had something to do with it.
The Mineral County Commissioners passed a unanimous
resolution opposing Champion's request for increased waste
dumping, and agreed to consider a lawsuit to prevent the
permit from going through.

Commissioner Mary Kay Noonen

said, "We are trying to organize because (the waste water)
will all come through Mineral County," downstream of the
mill, "And that to us is just going to destroy our water
supplies."

County Commission Chairman Tom Marvin said

Champion was proposing "to abuse a public resource.

My

biggest argument with the request is you have an industry
that is not being responsible,...and it's getting away with
it."
Marvin said an Environmental Impact Statement was
needed to analyze the proposal and address the concerns of
local residents. But Bureau Chief Steve Pilcher said, "We
have no reason to believe that the information submitted by
Champion is not factual and accurate. I hate to be so cold
as to say we can't afford to do an EIS to satisfy the
concerns of everyone. But in all honesty, that's sort of
what it boils down to."
The State of Idaho also blasted the mill's proposal.
In a letter to Montana Governor Ted Schwinden, Idaho
Governor John Evans asked that increased dumping by Champion
be delayed until the effects of the mill's pollution on the

river and Idaho's Lake Pend Oreille were thoroughly studied.
The call for further study and an Environmental Impact
Statement

was joined

by

the Montana

Environmental

Information Center and the Westslope Chapter of Trout
Unlimited.
On the day before the state's hearing, Missoula
City/County Health Department officials charged that the
Water Quality Bureau had
Champion's plan.

failed

to properly review

Environmental Health Director Elaine Bild

and Pollution Control Specialist Jim Carlson claimed that,
"The original (1974) EIS conclusion and subsequent expansion
permits issued by several state agencies gave the pulp mill
permission to expand, as long as the major components of air
and water discharges did not increase.

The original

expansion EIS was nearly disapproved by the Department of
Health, and the discharge limits were agreed upon by the
pulp mill management as a condition to obtain the expansion
permit."
The Missoula Health Department also claimed that the
Water Quality Bureau's tentative decision would be in
violation of the state's nondegradation policy, which
requires that existing high quality waters be maintained at
that high quality "unless it has been affirmatively
demonstrated to the board that a change is justifiable as a
result of necessary economic or social development and will
not preclude present and anticipated use of these waters;"
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The Health Department concluded that, "The Water
Quality Bureau should not allow any increase in the
permitted discharge of any pollutant without affirmative
direction from the State Board of Health."
Carlson and Bild also pointed out that the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act stated, "It is the national goal
that the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters be
eliminated by 1985."

The Bureau's endorsement of increased

discharge was contrary to the goal of federal law, they
stated.
Glenn Phillips, pollution control biologist for the
Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, also
criticized Champion's plans, claiming

the increased

discharge could reduce oxygen levels in the river, increase
suspended solids and possibly taint the taste of fish below
the mill.
Bureau Chief Steve Pilcher compJlained before the
hearing that critics were being too emotional, and not
specific in their objections.

He said the issue would be

decided on the facts, and not the number of critics.

"We're

not really playing a numbers' game. This is not a popularity
contest. We must have a solid basis for this decision," he
said.
Champion Spokesman Bob Kelly bristled at the objections
of opponents, "Critics talk about more studies," he said.
"Nobody is really saying what they want to be studied."
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Kelly claimed that the nondegradation policy did not
apply to Champion's request, because it was part of the
Water Quality Act and the request was filed under the
Montana Pollution Discharge Elimination System.
Bob Helding, of the Montana Wood Products Association,
told The Missoulian, "If it wasn't for the chips sold to
Champion these last two or three years, Montana's wood
products industry would have been on its knees."

Economic

development interests and those employed in the wood
products industry expressed fears that the waste-disposal
problems at the pulp mill would produce a negative ripple
effect throughout the state if the mill were forced to
curtail production.
By the time the Department of Health and Environmental
Sciences held their public hearing on November 10. it seemed
that 27 years of festering discontent over pollution control
at the Frenchtown pulp mill was about to explode.

Over 300

citizens from three states packed into the City Council
Chambers for that hearing, which all parties point to as a
pivotal event in the permit controversy.

Busloads of Idaho

and Washington residents arrived for the hearing, and the
Chambers became so crowded that many would-be participants
were turned away at the doors.
The hearing was lengthy, and often heated, as opponents
chastised the Department for their decision to allow the
increased dumping, and criticized the company for using
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"scare tactics" to push the plan through.
were also raised by critics.

Technical issues

Greg Munther, representing the

Westslope Chapter of Trout Unlimited, claimed the Clark Fork
was already under stress, and

that the Bureau had not

adequately addressed the possible effects of allowing
increased dumping.

He cited a fish kill during the previous

summer, below Frenchtown, as an indicator that the river
might be reaching a critical threshold.

Vicki Watson,

associate professor of Botany and Environmental Studies at
the University of Montana, claimed that the Bureau lacked
information to prove that the river would not be harmed by
the increased discharge.

She argued that those requesting

the change in permit conditions should have the burden to
prove that their proposal would not damage the river, that
the citizens should not be required to prove that it would.
Champion officials claimed their plan would protect the
river, but hinted that if the plan was rejected, jobs would
be lost.
The hearing was interrupted repeatedly by shouting
episodes, lengthy periods of applause and gavel pounding by
the hearing officer.
Mineral County Commissioner Marvin blasted the State,
"We're not just talking about the future of the Clark Fork
River," he said. "We're talking about the credibility of the
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences."
Champion's request was also criticized by the U.S.
85

Forest Service, Missoula County Commissioners, Missoula
City/County

Health

Board, Bonner

County, Idaho

Commissioners, and others.
Mill Manager Dan Potts said if the plan was rejected it
would impose more costs on the mill, making it harder for
them to compete in national markets.

That, he said, could

cost jobs. "It's important to our employees, the wood
products industry of western Montana, and the community of
Missoula that we stay competitive."

The mill's annual

payroll was about $20.7 million.
The jobs issue caused state representative Joe Hammond
of Alberton to bristle, "The strongest argument they have is
that if we don't agree with what they want, then, by God,
they'll cut off our jobs. Its do it our way or we'll take
our ball and go home," he said.
This historic hearing sent the permit issue into a
tailspin.

The process that was originally thought to take

only three months now had no end in sight.
also

And the event

lit a fire of public interest on behalf of the

beleaguered Clark Fork River and Lake Pend Oreille.

Active

conservationists of the time did not anticipate that such a
broad-based outpouring of supporters for the river and lake
would come out of the woodwork for such a hearing.

The

opposition had gained an undeniable momentum.

Just as quickly as the momentum had appeared, however,
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the opponents suffered new setbacks.

On November 14, the

Missoula City Council refused to pass a resolution opposing^
the increased waste dumping.
Ward

The vote was six to four.

4 alderman John Toole called

the

resolution

"harassment^ of Champion and the wood products industry.^"
And on November 28, Montana Governor Schwinden TcejxSJCX^^r-Idaho Governor Evan'_s_ request for further study of the
mill's effects on the river and

Lake Pend

Oreille.

Schwinden wrote, in a letter to Evans, "The concerns you
expressed, along with the concerns of many others, are being
evaluated by the Department of Health and Environmental
Sciences."

Schwinden enclosed with his letter a copy of

Montana's water quality

standards, which he said exceeded

Idaho's in many respects. "I suggest that you compare these
limitations with any similar mills which you have in Idaho,"
he wrote.
But on December 6, 1983, opponents of the expanded
discharge received good news from the Water Quality Bureau.
Bureau Chief Steve Pilcher announced that an expanded
environmental review of Champion's request would

be

prepared. He admitted that the Bureau had erred in its
initial review, "One of the mistakes - for lack of a better
word - we made is that we did not provide for review by the
general public a summary of the information we used to back
up our preliminary determination," he said.

Pilcher did not

indicate that the Bureau's recommendation would change, but

said that the expanded review would address the fears of
citizens about effects on the river and Lake Pend Oreille.
"It may not be to their satisfaction," he said. "But we will
answer their concerns to the best of our ability."
Meanwhile, Champion began to backpedal on its assertion
that their waste storage ponds would be filled to capacity
by mid-January unless the state granted their request to
discharge daily into the Clark Fork.

Mill Spokesman Bob

Kelly told The Missoulian that they now had several
additional weeks of storage in the 500 acre pond complex.
Critics began to wonder how much of an emergency this really
was for Champion.
The

DHES

completed

an

expanded

Preliminary

Environmental Review document in mid-January, 1984, which
provided further data to substantiate their tentative
decision and determined that a full environmental impact
statement was not warranted.

But it released the document

only to the state Environmental Quality Council and a few
other organizations.

This action angered environmentalists.

During a heated meeting in Helena, Tom Daubert, of

the

Montana Environmental Information Center, claimed, "The
state is clearly trying to keep the public out." WQB Chief
Steve Pilcher claimed his agency had exceeded state
requirements for public involvement, and that critics could
spend their time more productively by reviewing the document
than by complaining about the process.

Daubert claimed that

the state should have provided

a copy of the PER to all

interested parties, including the 300 people who attended
the November, 1983 hearing.

Pilcher denied that this was

required, or warranted.
Despite the claim that critics should review the PER,
the state announced that its final decision would be made
about one week following release of the PER, and that
DHES rules did not require another public comment period or
hearing.

The Environmental Information Center decided to

hold their own informational hearing on the PER if the state
failed to do so.
The state's PER narrowed the focus of their decision to
the terms of the proposed permit modification, rather than
the impact of the entire wastewater disposal system.
interpretation was not popular with critics,

This

whose comments

at the November hearing related primarily to the long-term
impacts of the pulp mill's discharge, rather than the change
that might result from increasing that discharge.

The DHES

claimed, in the PER, that most of the public's concerns
"could

not be supported by scientific documentation."

However, in response to public concerns about inadequate
knowledge of the river and the mill's impact, the PER
outlined an expanded monitoring program, which would be
partially supported by the mill and would be required
regardless of the state's decision to modify the permit
(DHES, 1984).
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In response to a "significant public reaction", the
DHES reversed its plans to proceed with a decision on the
permit within a week after the release of the PER* and
announced that their decision would be delayed for thirty
days to allow public review and comment.

WQB Chief Steve

Pilcher stated that all public comments would be taken into
account before the final decision was issued.
From the Water Quality Bureau's perspective the process
was beginning to bog down.

The Bureau's staff had been

engaged in a review of the mill's proposal since July, 1983,
and in their professional judgement the proposal would not
constitute a significant impact to the environment.

Under

these circumstances, they believed, they should not be
required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement.
Public

participation requirements for

preliminary

environmental reviews were being met or exceeded.

The

Bureau seemed to have great difficulty accepting all the
public criticism over what was, to them, a routine decision
which was well within their authority.
But the fact remained that the public had raised
significant questions about the potential impacts of the
proposed decision.

Many of these questions could not be

fully answered with available information.

Conservation

groups were demanding additional review periods, and holding
their own hearings.

The Flathead Tribal Council joined the

fray by requesting a full EIS, due to potential affects on
90

fishing rights guaranteed in the Hellgate Treaty of 1855.
The process was beginning to look much more like an
Environmental Impact Statement process with its requirements
for full analysis of alternatives, public review periods and
pubic hearings.

Even the PER document itself was starting

to look like an EIS in PER's clothing, stretching in length
to 50 pages and covering much of the subject material
necessary for an EIS.

But for whatever reason, be it staff

and budget restrictions, or bureaucratic inertia, the state
resisted

all requests to prepare an

official

EIS.

Confounding the public's perception of this stance, state
regulations allowed the Bureau to charge the industry for
the costs of an Impact Statement, but the expense of the PER
came out of the Bureau's already tight budget.
Public discussion of the permit issue continued despite
the lack of an official governmental process, and

the

Environmental Information Center held their promised public
forum on February 9, 1984.

The meeting did not constitute a

public hearing under the law, but WQB Chief Steve Pilcher
and mill representatives did attend, and the public was
allowed further opportunity to express their concerns.
Steve Pilcher claimed that the goal of the Clean Water Act,
to eliminate all sources of pollution to surface waters, was
just a goal and not a requirement of law.

Vicki Watson

argued that such statutory g^l^sh5ul<3 tell state agencies
which direction they ought to be going, even if the ultimate
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goal was not judged to be practical.
Bureau's decision

She claimed that the

was contrary to the goal of the Clean

Water Act, because allowing increased discharge meant we
were going in the wrong direction.
The Department of Health and Environmental Sciences
delayed an announcement of their final decision past the
February 21 deadline.

Mill officials announced that

emergency pond storage expansions would allow them to
accommodate all of their wastes, without

production

cutbacks, until the normal spring runoff discharge period in
May.
The decision-making process was at a standstill.

The

state's original plan to act within three months had now
dragged on for seven months.

The opponents had demanded,

and received additional information, review periods and
public meetings.

But the process used by the Water Quality

Bureau had failed to satisfy public concerns.

The problem

of rapid infiltration had been inadequately addressed in the
1974 EIS, and was still not being confronted squarely
through a careful analysis of alternatives in 1983. ^The
Bureau had chosen to work within a decision-making process
which limited public involvement and consideration of
alternatives.

Although they clearly believed this was

justified under the law, it only raised public fears and
suspicions and fostered further confrontation.
opponents won concessions allowing further review and
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When

comment, many responded with harsh criticism and stern
allegations.

The first public hearing turned into a

shouting match and grandstanding event as contestants vied
to see who could put on the best show in public.

Conflicts

were perpetuated by the process, rather than resolved.
The stalemate was broken in March, 1984

when a

coalition of environmental, property owner and sportsmen
groups, including the Westslope Chapter of Trout Unlimited,
National Wildlife Federation, Lake Pend Oreille Shoreline
Owners Association,

and

the Montana

Environmental

Information Center, initiated discussions with Champion
International Corporation to resolve the eight-month old
dispute.
The groups were represented by Missoula attorneys Karl
Englund, Tom France and Bill Rossbach, Sandpoint attorney
Steve Herndon, and Vicki Watson, serving as a technical
advisor.

Englund and Rossbach were instrumental, one year

earlier, in negotiating a $1.6 million settlement for the
construction of powerlines across Rock Creek, a blue ribbon
trout stream east of Missoula.
Following lengthy negotiations, a Memorandum of Agreement
was signed by the parties which would allow the
mill's increased discharge to occur for a period of two
years while intensive studies were performed on the effects
of the discharge on the river and Lake Pend Oreille.
The Conservation groups agreed not to fight the
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increased dumping or to initiate legal action during the two
year period.

Champion agreed to contribute $100,000 toward

studies of the river and its fishery.

The conservation

groups also agreed to contribute funds for the studies, and
a special "Technical Advisory Committee" would be formed
with 12 representatives of industry, government and citizen
groups to guide the studies.

An Environmental Impact

Statement was called for following the completion of the
studies, in 1986, prior to a state decision on a renewed,
five-year permit for increased waste discharge.

A Water

Quality Bureau representative attended one of the last
negotiating sessions, when requested, although they would
not actively participate in the discussions.

When the

negotiating parties called for the EIS, the Bureau agreed.
The negotiated settlements for both the Rock Creek
powerlines and the pulp mill permit were a new form of
public involvement in conservation issues in Montana.

The

negotiations followed lengthy periods of heightened
controversy, with ample expressions of grassroots
involvement.

But the discussions themselves were handled by

a small group of representatives from both sides.

The

conservation groups were represented primarily by their
attorneys.
In each case, the settlement was made possible by the
public controversy surrounding the industry proposal, and
the perceived likelihood that the proposal could be
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rejected.
The 1984 pulp mill settlement received some criticism
from the rank and file of conservation groups and other
downstream residents, who perceived it as an exchange of
cash for approval of the increased dumping.

The Flathead

Tribal Council was particularly harsh in their criticism of
the settlement.

But most of the opponents of the increased

discharge seemed pleased with the terms of the agreement
which required intensive study of the mill's impact, and
called for the preparation of an EIS before permit renewal
in two years.
But for those who were closely involved in the 1974
expansion controversy, and who remembered

the pledges

regarding the rapid infiltration system's potential failure,
the settlement was just another postponement of a decision
to install a treatment system which could handle production
from the expanded mill.
The Water Quality Bureau did not participate in the
talks, and

mainta i ned

that their decision would

necessarily be influenced by any agreements.

not

"It's great

anytime we can minimize the conflict or differences in
opinion

that

might

exist

between

industry

and

environmentalists," Bureau Chief Pilcher said at the time.
But he maintained that the authority and the responsibility
to make the decision still rested with the Water Quality
Bureau.

"I do not think it's appropriate for a state agency
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with the legal responsibility

for decision-making to

participate in this kind of an agreement.

It might smack of

a deal," he said.
Nonetheless, after the agreement had been reached, the
Water Quality Bureau scrutinized the plan and found it to be
consistent with the laws and regulations it was charged to
uphold.

On April 6, 1984, Department of Health and

Environmental Sciences Director John Drynan presented a two
year permit for increased waste discharge
International Mill Manager Dan Potts.

to Champion

He publicly announced

that the state would commit $200,000 toward intensive river
studies, and that an Environmental Impact Statement would be
prepared before the company's discharge permit could be
renewed.

In addition, a fishery study would be conducted by

the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks with $100,000
from the company.

Both studies would be reviewed by a

Technical Advisory Committee supported by the company and
the conservation groups.

Finally,.Champion International

Corporation was required

to initiate an engineering

evaluation of alternative wastewater treatment technologies
during the two year period, and all of these studies would
be used in the EIS.
Despite the high degree of public controversy during
the previous eight months, only a small audience turned out
for the announcement of the state's decision on the final
permit.

Most of the audience consisted of news media
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reporters and government officials.
Conservationists wondered

if the

same level of public

interest would be there when the permit came

up for renewal

in 1986.

TWO YEARS OF SCRUTINY

The state

Water Quality

Bureau launched its intensive

studies of the Clark Fork and the effects of mill
the spring of 1984.
1984

memorandum

biologists

As part of the studies set forth in the

of

gathered

agreement

and

information

on

quality parameters and fisheries
stretch

of

river

wastes in

from

above

discharge
a

variety

populations in
the

Milltown

permit,

of

water

a 120 mile

Dam, east of

Missoula, to the Idaho border.
Although most
provide valuable

people

agreed

the

studies would

information about the river and the mill's

effects, biologists claimed that
limited.

that

their usefulness

might be

Rod Berg, coordinator of the Clark Fork fisheries

study with the Department of Fish, Wildlife and

Parks, said

the studies

This is not

"don't represent a final solution.

something we'll fully understand in two years."
According to Vicki
University

of

Watson,

Montana,

one

aquatic

ecologist

of

most

the

at the

significant

compromises the conservation groups made in signing the 1984
memorandum of

agreement was to give up their demand for one

or

two

years

of

baseline

studies

before

the increased

discharge began.

The groups reluctantly settled for studies

which

conducted

would

period,

but

be

expressed

during

strong

the increased discharge
reservations

limitations of such an approach.

about

the

The Water Quality Bureau's

original statement of objectives for the studies stated that
they would determine whether there were changes in the river
as a result of the increased discharge.
that a

change could not be documentedwithout adequate data

prior to the
warned

the

commencement
Bureau

that

of
the

increased

allow the

Bureau to

Watson and
be

the

issue

the studies

and

would

groups
give

believed

She
would

would not

document changes in the river.

conservation

helpful,

discharges.

nondegradation

ultimately have to be addressed, and

would

But Watson claimed

Still,

the studies

them a better idea of

impacts than they had before.
Watson also criticized the inability of
test the

limits of

the mill's new permit.

the studies to
River flows and

water temperatures were about average during 1984, the first
summer of

discharge under

that problems
when river

from the

flows were

the new

permit.

Watson claimed

increased discharge

would be worse

low and

temperatures high.

Because

the color standard limited its discharge in 1985, a low flow
year, the

mill was

discharging wastes during the summer at

only a l-to-3,000 dilution ratio with

river water, although

permit limits could allow ratios as high as l-to-200.
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Champion

Spokesman

perspective, it was
any significant

Bob

as

Kelly

claimed,

anticipated.

We

"From

our

weren't expecting

or deleterious effects on the river when we

made the application for the permit."
numerous restrictions

on its

The

company said the

permit would

insure that the

river would be protected.
But Watson said
assess the

the

full effect

purpose

of the

of

the

studies

was to

permit changes, "If they're

not going to test the permit at that level (1:200 dilution),
then let's rewrite the permit," she said.
Richard

Solberg,

chairman

of

the technical advisory

committee (TAC) established by the memorandum

of agreement,

also claimed that two years of study may not be enough.
need 10 years of study, not
meeting

to

monitor

two," he

said.

"We

The TAC began

the

conduct

of state studies in May,

following the issuance of

the two

year permit.

studies had

progressed for

After the

two years, Solberg acknowledged

that, "It's true that no massive detrimental effect has been
seen

so

far.

But

a

river

ecosystem

is so variable and

dynamic that long-term research is necessary," he said.
The TAC continued to meet
review the

at

opinion

every

two

months to

design of the studies, assess their results, and

to discuss the content of
were

about

times
over

nondegradation

lively,

many

the
with

issues,

policy

upcoming

considerable

especially

issues,
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EIS.

and

Discussions

differences of

nutrient
the

loading,

analysis

of

alternatives

in the

upcoming

EIS.

But despite

the

differences of opinion, the TAC format allowed considerable
sharing

of

information

and

ideas.

The

level

of

communication established between the various parties in the
issue

was

unprecedented.

Some committee

members,

particularly those from the conservation groups, were
frustrated at times by the lack of authority vested in the
TAC.

Although the Bureau adopted many of the TAC's

suggestions for changes in the studies, the committee's
advice and requests of information to the state Water
Quality Bureau were not always heeded.

The committee did

not act as a board in a decision making process, voting on
various issues as they arose.

The TAC's meetings were,

instead, free wheeling events where

information was

presented by various investigators and ideas expressed by
any committee member who wished to do so.
Many conservationists had the mistaken impression that
the TAC would provide some sort of watchdog role over the
pulp mill issue.

This was not the case.

But the committee

did provide the valuable contribution of increasing the
communication among the various parties, and enhancing the
understanding of each others concerns and positions.

This

alone would prove to be quite valuable in the months ahead.
As it became clear that the TAC would not fulfill a
watchdog role, a number of citizen watchdog groups took
shape during 1985, including two groups of "River Watchers"
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in Plains and Noxon.

The river watchers took an unusual

approach to citizen participation, by actively assisting in
the monitoring of water quality and the effects of the pulp
mill.

Water Quality Bureau scientists Loren Bahls and Gary

Ingman went out of their way to instruct these groups in the
use of water quality monitoring equipment.

Volunteers spent

many hours of their own time collecting data on the river,
and this information was ultimately used in the preparation
of the state's EIS in 1986.
The river watchdog group which ultimately played the
most pivotal role in the pulp mill issue also took shape in
1985.

The Clark Fork Coalition provided a basin-wide

alliance of individuals, conservation and sportsmen groups
and businesses who were committed to improving the quality
of the Clark Fork River.

The Coalition was interested in

many issues along the river, including toxic waste cleanup
at Superfund sites, mining proposals and dam reconstruction.
But the pulp mill was the smoking gun that got the group
organized, uniting citizens and groups from three states
over the issue of water quality protection.

The group would

attract contributions of valuable technical expertise and
volunteer energy, and become a force to be reckoned with in
the permit renewal proceedings.
Like the citizens of the Clark Fork Coalition, the
state was coming to view the river as an entire basin.
Montana Governor Ted Schwinden created the Clark Fork River
101

Basin Project

to help

coordinate long-range, comprehensive

studies of the river, on April 30, 1984.
"unprecedented

state

effort",

would create a basin-wide
scarce study
the river in a

Schwinden

data base,

dollars, and

In

announcing the

said the project

make the

most out of

examine all potential impacts on

coordinated

manner.

The

Clark

Fork River

Basin Project established an interagency task force, made up
of all state, local and federal agencies conducting
the

river,

civic

and

a

leaders,

citizens'
industry

conservationists.

The

work on

advisory council, made up of
representatives

pulp

mill

studies

and

some

and EIS would

provide a focal point of discussions.
The Frenchtown pulp mill and the
never received
in its history.
"blue

ribbon"

Clark Fork

River had

such attention and active, public discussion
With so many official review committees and
panels

scrutinizing the issues, the general

public was understandably

confused

as

to

what

was being

accomplished.
By
collected

September,
the

last

1985,
sets

the
of

Water
data

Quality
to

be

Bureau
used

environmental review, and began preparing its EIS.
officials requested a five-year extension of
discharge permit,
months of study

claiming that

indicated

no

the

Champion

their expanded

the results of the past 18
detrimental

Clark Fork River or Lake Pend Oreille.
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in

had

effects

on the

STATE RELEASES DRAFT EIS

The Montana Department of Health and Environmental
Sciences released its Draft EIS on the pulp mill discharge
permit on December 24, 1985, and recommended that Champion
International Corporation be allowed to continue discharging
wastes into the Clark Fork under the terms of their current,
two year permit.

Water Quality Bureau Chief Steve Pilcher

said that the studies performed since 1984 had shown no ill
effects on the river.

"The assessment during the two year

period does not bear out the fears that were raised," he
said.

DHES scheduled a public hearing for January 28, in

Missoula, to take public comments on the Draft EIS.
Public response
materialize.

to

the Draft

The Clark

Fork

EIS

was slow

Coalition assumed

to
a

coordinating role for citizen review of the document,
establishing an independent review committee, and sponsoring
two public forums in Sandpoint and Missoula prior to the
January 28 hearing.

But the Coalition was unwilling to

issue a hasty response.
By mid-January, DHES officials were puzzled by the lack
of public reaction.

"We have had surprisingly little

feedback on the draft Environmental Impact Statement,"
Pilcher told a meeting of the Environmental Quality Council.
"I'm not sure of the reasons why."
Tom France, National Wildlife Federation attorney and
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EQC

member,

speculated

that

people

were no longer angry

about being locked out of the decision-making process.
maybe they

aren't as

confused about the process," he said.

France's assessment seems to have been correct.
longer

felt

the

need

to

vocalize

decision-making process because they
the

opportunity

comments and
State

to

with

rules

respond

Citizens no

criticisms
knew

they

about the
would have

to the draft EIS with written

testimony

for

"Now

at

the

Environmental

January

Impact

28 hearing.

Statements

would

require their comments to be considered, and responded to in
a

final

EIS.

The

Clark

organizations were busy
large

volumes

of

Fork

Coalition and its member

reviewing

supporting

the

data,

draft

and

EIS

preparing

and two
their

response.
But

the

portrayed as

attitude
one of

of

conservationists

enthusiasm.

situation looked

Both

Bureau

Water

Quality

and

determined

entrenched,

to

and

prove

the
that

pretty bleak.
mill

seemed to be an insurmountable

wall

between

their

and

of

data

seemed

their initial

prediction of no significant impact in 1983 was true.

conservationists

not be

Members of the Clark Fork

Coalition actually felt the
the

could

There

and politics

goal of improving the

river by tightening the pulp mill's permit.
But the Coalition continued its review of the draft EIS
and uncovered

significant bodies of information ommitted in

the document, including a lack of discussion of a full range
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of

alternatives,

the

nondegradation

monitoring requirements,

fisheries data,

of the

economic values

of the

policy,

future

and an assessment

river and lake for tourism,

recreation and quality of life values.
The Coalition was especially

firm in

its criticism of

the lack of discussion of alternatives in the draft EIS. The
Montana Environmental Policy Act required a full analysis of
a range

of alternatives

draft EIS

x

to the

proposed action.

jDresentedJonlyy three/ alternatives

for review,

But the

to the public

1) to den^Bre~p^rmitT^r^PProv^the permit as

proposed, and 3) modify the permit by including unspecified,
additional conditions.

During a January 21 public forum on

the permit issue, the Coalition claimed

that alternative 1,

to deny the permit, was not a realistic alternative, and had
never been suggested by
maintained, could
what

have merit,

modifications

alternative.

anyone.

might

Therefore, the

Alternative

3,

the CFC

but the DHES did not discuss
be

considered

public had

under

this

no opportunity to

provide substantive comments on alternative 3,

and the only

choice left was to approve the permit as proposed.
As written, the draft EIS focused on the compilation of
18 months of studies
CFC

claimed

discussion of

that,
the

by various
"The

full

DEIS
range

agencies and
should
of

groups.

include

The

a thorough

alternatives, including

alternative treatment technologies, and an assessment of the
relative costs and benefits of each."
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The CFC called

for a

complete

re-drafting

of

the EIS. "The alternatives should

then be presented again to the public for
a public

review, including

hearing in Missoula, before the WQB adopts a final

EIS with a preferred alternative for action."
The Governor's Citizen Advisory Council met

on January

22, the day after the Coalition's forum, to review the draft
EIS, and

the

alternatives.

discussion

EIS."

focused

on

the

issue of

Following lengthy debate, the Council adopted

a motion calling for
public and

again

"further

review

of

alternatives for

industry to comment on prior to a hearing on the

Specifically, the

Council called

for "more options

under Alternative number 3."
On the

day before

the state's January 28 hearing, the

Water Quality Bureau again came under fire from the Missoula
City/County Health

Department and others for their handling

of the draft EIS.

The Health Department's pollution control

specialist, Jim
1983.
and

Carlson, criticized the Bureau as he had in

"Our biggest

the

way

Attorney Karl
Advisory

concerns are

they've

handled

Englund, a

Council,

the Water

this,"

member of

renewed

the

he

Quality Bureau
said.

Missoula

the Governor's Citizen

criticism

inadequate discussion of alternatives.

of the Bureau's

"That's a very, very

important part," of the EIS, Englund said.
Bureau Chief

Steve Pilcher

the purpose of the EIS

was

various

during

studies

made
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to

responded by stating that

provide

a

summary

of the

the past 18 months, and that

public comments would be used to revise the report.

STATE HOLDS HEARING ON DRAFT EIS

About 300 concerned citizens arrived for the state's
January 28 public hearing in Missoula.

Water Quality Bureau

Chief Steve Pilcher opened the hearing by noting that the
respectable crowd indicated a continued, strong public
interest in the water quality of the Clark Fork River.

He

summarized the findings of the 18 month study of the river,
and reiterated his claim that the purpose of the Draft EIS
was to compile the data used by the agency in making their
tentative decision on the permit issue.

He said that public

comments would be used to revise the report, if necessary,
and that a final EIS would be prepared before formally
proposing permit conditions for the mill.

The public would

have a chance to review the conditions at that time, he
said, noting that further alternatives could be discussed
throughout the process.
The

hearing

audience

listened

as

the

state

Environmental Quality Council unexpectedly criticized the
draft EIS.

Resource specialist Hugh Zackheim claimed, "The

abbreviated discussion of alternatives
to meet

the intent of the law."

is insufficient
Zackheim noted, "In

presenting the department's options to deny, approve or
modify the permit, the text does not indicate what legal
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criteria

apply.

discussion

of

nondegradation

This

could

state

be an appropriate place for a

water

law,

and

quality

how

the

standards

department

and

uses

the

these

statutes in its analysis of policy options."
"The upcoming public notice and decision process on the
actual

wastewater

department of

discharge

the obligation

permit

does

to fully

not relieve the

present and analyze

the proposed action in the EIS. An EIS is not intended to be
just a compilation of studies: rather,

it must

provide the

public with as complete an understanding as practical of the
proposed action," Zackheim said.
The Environmental Quality Council called for a thorough
treatment of the alternatives in a draft EIS supplement or a
revised DEIS. Without such action, the
EIS would

not meet

the obligations

EQC said,

the draft

imposed by the Montana

Environmental Policy Act.
The EQC's call for
the Missoula

a revised

City/County Health

Coalition and

others.

Governor's Citizens'

Howard

draft EIS

was joined by

Department, the Clark Fork
Johnson,

representing the

Advisory Council, disappointed council

members by failing to present the statement developed at its
last

meeting,

calling

for

more analysis of alternatives.

The Citizens' Advisory Council never met again.
The Technical Advisory Committee
unresolved

concerns

including
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data

presented
gaps,

a

list of

frequency

of

monitoring, length

of the mill's mixing zone, toxic

substances and other important issues.

The TAC did not seem

to agree that the draft EIS gave the increased discharge a
clean bill of health.
DHES announced

that the public review and comment

period would be extended for 30 additional days, to February
28.

But they had heard so much of the same kind of comment

from conservation groups, other agencies and advisory
groups, that the outcome was pretty well understood before
the hearing
hearing.

officer's gavel closed the January public

The Draft EIS would need a major overhaul.

The

only decision left to be made was how to accomplish it, and
how to announce it.
DHES and Schwinden Administration officials initiated
earnest discussions of the problem following the public
hearing.

Talks focused on the manner in which the draft EIS

could be shored up to meet legal requirements and satisfy
public concerns.

There

was great reluctance to take the

most drastic step called for by the Coalition and the EQC,
to completely revise and reissue the draft EIS and start the
process over.

Such a move would certainly cause the DHES

and the Administration much public embarrassment.
Schwinden had

publicly claimed

Governor

that protection

and

enhancement of the Clark Fork was a high priority of his
administration when he announced the formation of the Clark
Fork River Basin Project.

And some officials were concerned
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with

establishing

draft EIS could be
DHES

and

WQB

a

precedent

totally rejected

officials

process glitches

whereby

and

seemed

delays

the contents of a

on procedural grounds.

reluctant

experienced

to

in

replay the
the troubled

times of 1983 and 1984.
A complete
Officials

draft EIS

deliberated

revision was

plans

for

the

not in the cards,.
preparation

of

an

addendum to the existing document.

CFC PRESENTS A "CITIZENS' ALTERNATIVE"
While
contemplated
studying

the

alternatives.
on the
range

the

DHES

and

their

next

move,

proposed
The group

permit issue,
of

permit

Schwinden
the
and

formed its

and attracted

volunteers.

These

Administration

Coalition
a

range

was

busy

of available

own advisory committee
the support

included

Vicki

of a wide

Watson, Greg

Munther of Trout Unlimited, Ron Erickson of the University's
Environmental Studies Department, Tom France of the Wildlife
Federation, Marty Onishuk of the League of Women Voters, Jim
Curtis of the Sierra Club, Dennis Workman of
of Fish,
and

many

Wildlife and
others.

On

the Department

Parks, Peter Nielsen (CFC Director),
February

25

the

group

took the

offensive and announced a Citizens' Alternative for the pulp
mill's permit.
The announcement came only days before

the planned end

of comment period on the draft EIS, and it caused the
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Water Quality Bureau to hastily announce its own plans to
prepare an addendum to the DEIS.

The Coalition's proposal

took officials by surprise, and backed up the group's claims
of inadequate alternatives in the DEIS by presenting a
specific set of well researched conditions for the mill's
new permit.

The Alternative was a well-reasoned compromise

which called for the eventual rollback of the mill's permit
conditions to those in effect before the controversy ignited
in 1983.

The Coalition quickly forced public debate to

shift from the problems with the mill's proposal and the
state's draft EIS to a very specific set of well documented
proposals.
Key provisions of the Citizens' Alternative included:
- Issuance of a temporary five year permit with revised
conditions, and a mid-term evaluation to consider
possible permit changes based on information gathered
in the meantime.
- A return to the discharge limitations and permit
conditions in effect before year-round discharge began
in 1984, by no later than 1991.
- Maintenance of the 2 million pound/year limitation on
Total Suspended Solids, rather than expanding the
allowable discharge to 4 million pounds per year.

The

TSS limitation would be calculated, however, on a 3
year running average, with an absolute maximum of 2.5
million

pounds per year. This would allow some
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additional discharge

in years when river

flow

conditions allowed adequate dilution.
- Maintaining the current 7.0 milligrams per liter
(mg/1) instream dissolved oxygen threshold for cutoff
of mill discharges, but allowing a maximum of just 1
mg/1 reduction of DO in the river from above the mill
to below its mixing zone.
- a new limitation restricting the mill's discharge to
periods when river water temperatures were below 65
degrees F, to avoid additional stress on cold water
fisheries.
- A new limitation to reduce total nutrient loading
(phosphorous and Nitrogen) to levels discharged prior
to the 1984 permit modifications.

The Citizens' Alternative stated, " We request that the
Bureau begin with this permitting process to take an active
rather than passive role to protect the Clark Fork River
from further degradation and to use all of its available
resources and imagination to develop a truly comprehensive
water quality management policy for the Clark Fork River
Basin."
In response to the Coalition's Alternative, a Water
Quality Bureau spokesman announced, "We are attempting to
address some of what were perceived as deficiencies" by
preparing an addendum to the Draft EIS. The Bureau had
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already prepared a draft outline of the addendum, and in an
effort to improve avenues for input, they circulated it to
the members of the Technical Advisory Committee for review.
The Coalition was also directly consulted about the content
of the proposed addendum, and the Water Quality Bureau
agreed to include the groups Citizens* Alternative in the
document along with a range of other alternative actions.
The Bureau also announced that they would include new
sections in the addendum to describe the nondegradation
policy and its effect on the proposed decision, and the
economic benefits of clean water.

The document would also

include more data, including the previously omitted report
on fisheries from the Department of Fish, Wildlife and
Parks.

NONDEGRADATION BECOMES THE FOCUS

The Montana Water Quality Act

had been enacted in

1967, and amended in 1971 to include a

strict policy

intended to protect state waters from further water quality
degradation:
75-5-303 Nondegradation Policy.

The Board

shall

require: (1) that any state waters whose existing water
quality is higher than the established water quality
standards be maintained at that high quality unless it
has been affirmatively demonstrated to the board that a
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change is justifiable as a result of necessary economic
development and
anticipated

will not preclude

uses of

present and

these waters, and (2) any

industrial, public, or private project or development
which would constitute a new source of pollution to
high quality waters

to provide the degree of waste

treatment necessary to maintain that existing high
water quality.

In 1982, the Montana Board of Health and Environmental
Sciences adopted administrative rules to implement this far
reaching policy.

These rules state:

16.20.702 APPLICABILITY AND LIMITATION OF STATE WATER
DEGRADATION -- GENERAL (1) The requirements of this
sub-chapter apply to any activity of man which would
cause a new or increased source of pollution to state
waters. (2)

If the Board determines, based

on

necessary economic or social development, that
degradation may be allowed, in no event may degradation
of state waters interfere with or become harmful,
detrimental or injurious to public health, recreation,
safety, welfare, livestock, wild birds, fish and other
wildlife or other beneficial uses.
16.20.703 PERMIT CONDITIONS TO ENSURE NONDEGRADATION
(1)

In Issuing a permit to a new or enlarged point

source, the department shall include conditions in the
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permit to ensure that the quality of receiving waters
whose quality is higher than established water quality
standards will not be degraded by the discharge of
pollutants from the source.

In Section 16.20.704 the Board established procedures
under which a discharger may appeal specific limits imposed
by the Department to ensure nondegradation, including a
lengthy and comprehensive set

of

requirements for

petitioning the Board for permit amendments.
Once DHES made the decision to prepare an addendum to
the Draft

EIS, and

to

include a broader

range of

alternatives in the addendum, the Coalition shifted their
focus.

The group remained quite concerned about the type of

alternatives DHES might present in the addendum. But their
request to have the Citizens' Alternative included in the
addendum

was backed

by numerous citizen groups and

businesses along the river, and by other state agencies,
including

the Environmental Quality Council.

The

alternatives question seemed to be pretty well under control
when DHES notified

the Coalition that the Citizens'

Alternative would be included in the addendum.

The group

then turned to another issue that could help them win
approval of the Citizens' Alternative.

That issue was

nondegradation.
The cornerstone

of
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the Coalition's Citizens*

Alternative was
nondegradation.

the five-year

objective to assure

The new permit should return to the

discharge conditions in effect prior to 1984, within five
year's time, the group claimed.
DHES released their addendum to the Draft EIS on March
17, 1986.

In announcing the release, Steve Pilcher stated,

"While no one likes criticism, the comments (received at the
January hearing) have helped us establish the level of
information the public desires."

The Department announced

its plans to hold another public hearing on the addendum, on
April 17.
At this point the controversy began to focus for the
first time on the legal issues surrounding state and federal
nondegradation policy and state rules to implement that
policy.
Critics were generally pleased with the topics
addressed by the Draft EIS addendum.

The EQC's Hugh

Zackheim said, "It's fair to say the original fell short.
The addendum definitely meets the requirements of MEPA," he
said.

The Coalition also praised the beefed up content of

the new document, stating

in the April issue of its

newsletter, Currents, "The document does a much more
thorough job of presenting information and policy analysis
which were not addressed in the first draft."
The Addendum included the Citizens' Alternative as one
of five choices for review.
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But the DHES recommended a

hybrid alternative, which incorporated some features of the
Citizens' Alternative, and retained the main feature of the
draft EIS preferred alternative which did not require the
mill to return to former discharge levels or to replace the
failing rapid infiltration system.

Still, the Coalition was

generally pleased that the DHES had agreed to provide a mid
term review of the permit, and to require further monitoring
and special studies of foam, nutrient loading and mixing
zone

length.

The

changes

in

the

recommendations for action were viewed
developments in the whole process.

department's
as positive

The group was also

pleased that DHES had included a section in the addendum
spelling out the department's stand on nondegradation.

But

they differed markedly with the agency's stance and the
reasoning behind it.

ARE ALL WASTES INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY?

In the concluding paragraph of the addendum's section
on nondegradation, DHES stated, "Presently, there are no
data to indicate that increased levels of nutrients
(phosphorous and nitrogen) have caused . chan-ges-aO-he
aquatic communities of the ClarTc Fork River or Lake Pend
Oreille.

Thus, it cannot be concluded that the present

levels of nutrients have degraded either the river or the
lake.

If future monitoring shows that there are undesirable
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changes in either the river of the lake, this permit and all
other permits in the Clark Fork Basin will be revised to
limit nutrient impacts." (DHES, 1986)
The Coalition objected strongly to this reasoning,
claiming it amounted to a policy of degradation, not
nondegradation.

In a special bulletin to Coalition members,

the group's advisory committee members wrote, "(DHES) will
do nothing to limit the mill's dumping until they see a
problem in the river which is directly attributable to the
mill.

In other words, they will allow the_ degradation to

occur first, then we can attempt to prove a cause and effect
re1ationshto the waste discharge, and then DHES will
think about doing something to fix the problem!"
Federal and state nondegradation policy and regulations
contained clear statements of intent to prevent degradation
from occurring, not to allow it in the absence of difficult
to obtain scientific proof.

A 1985 EPA guidance document on

anti-degradation (federal statutory language uses anti
instead of nondegradation terminology) stated, j^sTnc^) such
activities (new dischargers or expansion of existing
dischargers) would presumably lower water quality, they
would not be permissable unless the state finds that it is
necessary to accommodate important economic or social
development." (EPA, 1985) This differed markedly from DHES'
interpretation that they must first prove that

the

degradation had already occurred before restricting the
118

increased discharge.

EPA guidance also stated. "The burden

of demonstration on the
will be

very high,"

individual proposjjij^

ty

contrasting to the DHES interpretation

that the burden of proof was on the citizens or
Vicki Watson,
March, 1986,

speaking at the Coalition's annual meeting in
reiterated

demonstrate

that

"The burden of
change, not

the aqerjcy.

the

proof

on the

her

claim

that

the

mill should

increased discharge was not harmful.
should

be

on

citizens to

them

to

justify the

justify keeping things the

same," she said.
Critics claimed that by placing the burden of
the

citizens,

DHES

would

almost

increased discharges of pollutants
and

other

permitted

anyone's

river.

and weather

ability

pollutant

to

loading

had

from

year

river

that

caused
the Clark

to

Watson

that

at the mill
claimed

conditions,

that

and highly

conditions, would severely limit

prove

Systems like

variable

on

assure

would occur

facilities.

inadequate baseline data
variable flow

certainly

proof on

year,

a

a

moderate

increase in

measurable effect on the

Fork are

large and highly

and it is difficult, if not

impossible to blame one source of pollutants for a change in
water

quality

data

that

could

just

as

well

have been

influenced by natural variation, she said.
In the absence of a comprehensive plan to
quality in

the basin,

permits on

a case

manage water

the regulatory agency tends to issue

by case
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basis, and

determine that each

permit on its own would not cause a measurable degradation
of the resource.
sources

together

But Watson asserted that all of the
could

degradation of water quality.

indeed c a u s e a

significant

The nondegradation rules were

passed to preserve high quality waters.

But the DHES

interpretation would have allowed incremental degradation to
occur u n c h a l l e n g e d , until established water quality
standards were violated, at which time steps would be taken
to prevent those violations.
The Clark Fork Coalition and others espoused a policy
of improvement in water quality conditions in the Clark Fork
Basin.

This policy was backed up by Montana Governor Ted

Schwinden, who told Coalition members at their 1986 annual
meeting that, "In the 1980's we have recognized the
opportunity - indeed the responsibility - to bring the Clark
Fork back to life

as we approach our Centennial, we can

feel proud that, in Montana's second century, the Clark Fork
will gradually be restored to what a river should be - a
source of life and of inspiration to those whose lives touch
it."
But the Coalition claimed that the DHES under the
Schwinden Administration would allow pollutant loads to
increase by not enforcing the nondegradation policy.

"We

can only wish that the Governor's strong commitment to
improving the Clark Fork could be mirrored by the actions of
the Dept. of Health and Environmental Sciences," the
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Coalition's

advisory

committee

wrote

in

its

membership

bulletin.
Public awareness of the nondegradation issue heightened
in

the

weeks

before

application for its
first

the

April

expanded

significant

test

17

hearing.

The mill's

permit

became the

pollution
of

Montana's

15

year

old

nondegradation policy.
During a Technical Advisory Committee meeting to review
the addendum, Vicki Watson, Peter Nielsen and Jim Carlson of
the Missoula City/County
mill's proposal,

Health

which they

Department

challenged the

claimed would more than double

the amount of solids, nitrogen and phosphorous discharged by
the mill

and allow

the low

flow and high

temperature conditions of summer when aquatic

life are most

vulnerable

to

Carlson said,
water is
then

disposal during

pollution.

The

Health

"The nondegradation

Department's

policy says

Jim

that if the

cleaner than what the state standards provide for,

that

water

certainly doesn't

shall

remain

relatively

clean.

That

mean you're allowed to pollute that water

all the way up to the standard."
But the Water Quality

Bureau's

Abe

Horpestad claimed

that a strict interpretation of the policy would be onerous,
and have the effect of
state and

"throwing

up

a

fence"

around the

preventing population and industrial growth.

The

mill's Larry Weeks concurred, "If you allow no increase from
what it is now - no increase in discharge or
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dischargers -that means you stop all development."
Conservationists concerns about the nondegradation
policy were being portrayed as a no-growth position, in an
attempt to turn public opinion against an extreme viewpoint.
Undaunted, the Coalition's committee of volunteers prepared
an in-depth review of the policy and its implications for
the pulp mill permit.

They networked their information

widely through member organizations and encouraged citizens
to show up at the April 17 hearing to speak on behalf of the
river, and the Citizens' Alternative.
The nondegradat„LQ.n_policy became the clear focus of the
Ajaril 17 hearing, as an estimated three to one majority of
testifiers opposed the permit terms proposed by DHES.

In an

unusually unified and well informed display of public
testimony, virtually all opponents addressed specific
complaints

toward

nondegradation.

the

DHES'

interpretation

of

The Clark Fork Coalition's representatives,

including the author, Vicki Watson, Jim Curtis, Greg Munther
and Tim Williamson of the Plains River Watchers group,
claimed that proponents were misrepresenting its position as
"no-growth" and

"extremist".

The

purpose of

the

nondegradation policy is to limit waste discharges through
better treatment and management, not to limit economic
growth, the group said.

Since the river and lake were

valuable assets for tourism and recreation industries, and
help attract new businesses to the region, the proposal to
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allow more pollution was the no-growth policy, not the
policy of nondegradation.
No one speaking at the hearing suggested that the pulp
mill be denied a five-year permit to discharge its wastes.
It was the terms of that permit, and the effect of the
nondegradation po1icy~~wHTcK"""wer:e at issue.
Representatives of the Technical Advisory Committee
complained that DHES had failed to respond to their requests
for further information in the addendum on nutrient loads,
solids, and color discharges from the mill.
Vicki

Watson claimed

that most of

TAC member

the committee's

recommendations for the addendum, with the exception of
further studies, were ignored.

"The addendum suggests to me

that the Water Quality Bureau does not take the TAC very
seriously with regard to decision making.

I think they know

a toothless tiger when they see it," she said.
The Missoula City/County Health Department complained
about the continued problem with rapid infiltration.

"There

is still no proposal in the short or long term to replace
this treatment system with something equivalent," the
Department said in prepared testimony.
The Health Department, National Wildlife Federation and
the Coalition all threatened to pursue due process remedies,
including appeals and possible lawsuits, if the DHES did not
change its interpretation of the nondegradation policy.
DHES representatives

wore a look of exhaustion and
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exasperation following the beating they took at the hearing.
Despite their best efforts to respond to criticism, despite
considerable efforts to prepare the draft EIS and addendum,
they had been raked over the coals once again.

This time,

however, there were serious and well researched legal
threats on the winds of the public testimony.

It was time

for DHES to step back and take another look. A lengthy
process of internal legal consultation was initiated, and
DHES was not heard from publicly for several months.

INACTION TESTS THE OPPOSITION'S PATIENCE

During the weeks following the April hearing the
Coalition kept up the pressure by contacting the EPA, which
oversees the state's handling of discharge permits, and
Governor Schwinden, who had made strong commitments to clean
up the Clark Fork River. The EPA responded by pointing out
serious problems with the state's interpretation of the
nondegradation rules. "One area where the state and EPA
appear to differ is in regard

to the need

for full

intergovernmental coordination and public participation in
establishing that allowing lower water quality is necessary
to accommodate important economic or social development in
the area in which the waters are located", wrote Montana
Office Director John Wardell in a May 2 letter to Steve
Pilcher.

"Discussion of the Company's efforts to identify
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and implement wastewater treatment alternatives to replace
the failing rapid infiltration system is very brief and does
not indicate much sincere effort by the Company to solve its
problem," Wardell continued.
Montana Governor Schwinden responded by calling a
meeting with DHES staff, in which he reportedly made
reference to the section of Montana's clean water statute
which states that new or expanded dischargers must, "provide
the degree of waste treatment necessary to maintain that
existing high water quality" in streams whose quality exceed
state standards.
More time passed as DHES engaged in protracted internal
review of the issue with their technical and legal staff.
Conservationists grew impatient as another season of
summertime discharge approached, and low snowpack conditions
posed a potential threat to the river.

The state's inaction

was not a reflection of bureaucratic laziness or disregard
for public concerns.

On the contrary, as they got farther

and farther into it, everyone began to realize that the case
would

establish

some

very

important

precedents.

Nondegradation policies and their use were new territory for
Montana, in fact only a handful of states in the country had
seriously grappled with the problems that confronted DHES on
this issue.

Based on past experiences with the issue, DHES

was very reluctant to jump and make a hasty decision that it
would later regret.

More time passed.
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THE COALITION MOVES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Although

the

DHES"

decision frustrated
time

allowed

lengthy

delay

conservationists

tempers

to

cool

in reaching their

at

first,

and permitted those on all

sides of the issue to reconsider their goals
carefully.

By mid-May,

made by

reviewed

of

the

most

disagreement.
initiative

the

hearing testimony

mill officials at various meetings,

and recognized significant
some

and objectives

the Coalition's Board of Directors

and advisory committee had
and statements

the extra

opportunities

important

for

agreement on

points which had caused past

At this point, the Coalition took the unusual

to

request

meetings

with DHES, the Governor's

staff and Stone Container Corporation, who had purchased the
Frenchtown mill

The

Coalition's

skepticism at
issue,

and

own

request

first.

the

reluctant to
their

in early 1986, to settle the entire matter.

Due to

previous

engage in

in-house

was

met

the sensitive

threat

of

was

defensible position was reached.
their requests, asking for

the

apparent

nature of the

lawsuits,

discussions with

review

with

DHES

was

the parties until

complete

and

a

legally

The Coalition persisted in
meetings

in

five separate

written and telephone communications with DHES and Schwinden
Administration officials.

The

conservation group insisted

that the parties involved were no longer entrenched and
their positions not that far apart.

But DHES officials

still seemed skeptical and suspicious of the group's
motives.
On May 20, Governor Schwinden wrote to the Coalition
suggesting

that the meetings proceed.

But the DHES

hesitated further as their closed door meetings continued to
iron out internal differences of opinion.
On June 3, the Coalition wrote to the Governor stating
they were "surprised and disappointed that we have received
no response to our request for such a meeting from DHES."
It was, after all, quite rare for a conservation group to
approach the agency with an offer to reach a settlement.
The group expected a warm reception, but did not receive it.
In a last ditch effort to move the agency off dead
center, the group threatened legal action in a letter to
Governor Schwinden. "We have contacted legal counsel, and
are prepared to seek an injunction on the mill's summertime
discharge if we do not reach an agreement before the end of
this month.

We have assembled a slate of technical experts

whose testimony will support our case, and we are confident
that the court will agree with us," the group wrote.
On June 13, 1986 the Governor's office officially
notified Stone Container, the Clark Fork Coalition and DHES
that a meeting would take place on June 25 to discuss the
terms of the pulp mill's discharge permit.
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Howard Johnson,

an aide to Governor Schwinden, wrote, "The decision
regarding the permit will be made by the department of
Health and Environmental Sciences, but I expect we can all
agree on appropriate permit conditions."
Governor Schwinden later wrote to the Coalition,
stating, "I am urging all concerned parties to expedite
their efforts to find a reasonable solution to this problem,
consistent with the state's water quality regulations."

THE TALKS BEGIN

June 25 was a big day.

The atmosphere was tense.

No

one was quite sure how things would turn out, or if they
were doing the right thing by being there.

Each party

involved was assuming a huge risk by engaging in these
discussions.
The Coalition representatives, including the author,
Kathy Hadley, Vicki Watson and attorney Jack Tohulske, had
gone to great lengths to make the meeting happen. But in so
doing, they had placed themselves in an uncomfortable
position.

Despite extensive efforts to consult with

Coalition members before the meeting, there was no guarantee
that any negotiated settlement reached that day would
actually be supported by their constituents.

Worse yet, the

conservationists wondered if a negotiated settlement might
be blasted by a vocal minority of concerned citizens,
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setting the issue back into a hopeless confrontation once
again.

The Coalition was cast in the role of advocacy for

the river. But at the same time the group was openly
courting a settlement.

Their duty was to represent the

advocacy interests of their constituents.

But they had made

the decision to do so by deliberately seeking compromise.
This apparent conflict in roles did
conservationists.

not escape the

They had placed their own reputations on

the line by entering the negotiations.
The Department of Health and Environmental Sciences was
also assuming considerable risks as it entered the meeting.
The statutory responsibility and authority to make decisions
regarding the discharge permit was the Department's. The
staff took that responsibility seriously, and maintained
that

they

could

negotiations.

not

participate actively

But they agreed to

in

the

coordinate the meeting to

help resolve disputes between the conservation groups and
the industry.

The DHES was represented by Deputy Director

Bill Opitz, Steve Pilcher, Attorney Frank Crowley, and
others. They seemed to have lingering doubts.

What if the

parties reached an agreement which was not wholly consistent
with the laws and regulations the agency was charged to
uphold?

How would the public respond to their rejection of

such an agreement?

How would the public interpret their

power in decision making if they did approve an agreement
negotiated by other parties?
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DHES officials had placed

considerable faith in the negotiating parties.

They had

much to lose if the negotiations turned sour.
And Stone Container assumed risks too.

The outcome of

the talks could have a profound influence on the mill,
economically and politically.

The individuals representing

the Corporation, including mill manager Dan Potts, Larry
Weeks, Curt Barton and attorney Russ Frye, were under great
pressure to solve the problem.

Their own reputations and

their positions within the Company were at stake.

Those

pressures were increased markedly when the DHES' Bill Opitz
opened the meeting by announcing the Department's revised
interpretation of the nondegradation rules, and

their

intention to deny the mill's request for expanded discharge.
Stone and the Coalition had actually been notified of
the Department's decision before the meeting, through phone
conversations with DHES attorney Frank Crowley.

DHES had

reviewed its interpretation of the nondegradation

rules, in

response to the comments of critics, and determined that a
procedural issue concerning the division of labor between
the Department and the Board of Health and Environmental
Sciences was the key.

DHES maintained that the Company was

requesting increased discharge due to a failing treatment
system, and was asking DHES to authorize their request in
order to avoid expenditures on a replacement treatment
system.

DHES now agreed with its critics, that such

decisions to balance additional waste discharge against the
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costs of treatment belonged with the Board, the quasijudicial branch of the government, and
Department, the administrative branch.

not with the

DHES would therefore

deny the company's request, issue a permit reflecting the
terms of the 1982 permit, and notify the company of their
right to file a petition for amendments to the Board within
30 days, under the procedure outlined in the nondegradation
rules.
The DHES decision immediately put Stone into the role
of appellant, and declared victory for the Coalition.

The

conservation group might have been satisfied with the
decision, and withdrawn their request for negotiations.
they did not.

But

The group was concerned that they might well

win the battle, but leave themselves open to losing the war
at a later date through company appeals or even revisions of
the nondegradation policy in the legislature.

Once again,

the Coalition was placed in the unusual position where they
had the duty to zealously represent the immediate interests
of their constituents, but an obligation to settle the issue
in a manner which could protect their long-term interests.
The negotiations proceeded.

The "nondegradation

permit" reflecting original, 1982 terms was set aside, and
the parties resolved to find permit terms they could all
agree with.

If this could be accomplished, the company

could present terms to the Board in its amendment petition
which would receive the support of conservationists.
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As

long as

the Board would concur, the parties would all enjoy

a much more

predictable

resolution

to

the

conflict than

might be achieved through confrontational proceedings before
the Board, or litigation.
There

was

available to

no

for

conflict

mediation

the Coalition representatives, no instructions

on how to proceed.
as an

"cookbook"

attorney.

One of the

conservationists was trained

Lawyers are

trained to settle cases in a

court of law, based

on a

vigorous representation

clients and browbeating.

of their

Intimidation plays a great role in

discussions between lawyers — conciliation and mediation is
difficult under

these circumstances.

its attorney possessed great

Stone Corporation and

experience in

such conflicts,

as much of our modern mediation theory has been developed in
labor

law.

The

conservationists

were

at

an immediate

disadvantage in terms of negotiating experience.
To

further

confuse

mediator was not clearly
attorney seemed

to be

the

discussions,

established.

comfortable

in

DHES staff

role

of

and its

prepared to assume the role, but did

not assert themselves as such.
more

the

the

The Department

role

was clearly

of observer.

Early in the

talks, Stone and its attorney seized the floor

to present a

lengthy series

of arguments.

in a

law, rather

court of

they brought

They behaved as if they were

than a

negotiating session, as

forth technical experts armed with data, legal

arguments and flip charts to make their best case.
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The Coalition was reluctant to engage in these tactics
and, following token responses to company statements,
established the first move toward mediation.

The Coalition

insisted that further talks focus on the limited issues on
which agreement was possible, while setting aside, for the
time being, disagreements over non-essential technical and
legal issues.

Acting as spokesman for the Coalition, the

author stated, "Over the past two years, and especially the
past six months, we've all spent considerable effort
analyzing this issue, reviewing the data and discussing
various alternatives.

It seems that we have all come to a

more thorough understanding of the situation than we had in
1984 - and that includes a more complete understanding of
each other's position on the issue, and what needs to be
done to satisfy all of our concerns.

I also believe we have

come to a point where we can reach substantial agreement on
what needs to be done to resolve the issue at hand - and
that is the pulp mill's discharge permit.

That doesn't mean

that we can agree now, or ever, on all of the technical
issues, interpretations of data and so forth.

We probably

shouldn't expect to ever completely achieve this - maybe we
just have to agree to disagree on certain things, put them
aside, clear out our minds and find some common ground on
the issue at hand."
Stone then presented an offer to contribute an
unspecified, but substantial amount of cash for further
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river studies in exchange for an agreement on relaxed permit
conditions.

The Coalition quickly rejected this notion, and

reiterated its suggestion to talk permit terms.
At this point in the talks the parties agreed to focus
on five permit limitations of concern, 1) TSS, 2) BOD, 3)
flow and temperature discharge cutoff thresholds, 4) color
standard compliance monitoring, and, 5) nutrients.

The

Department circulated a draft permit for the purposes of
discussion, including suggested compromise conditions.
Stone and

the Coalition reviewed

the proposals, and

countered with their own proposals for each limitation
category.

All three proposals were then recorded on

chalkboards for all to see.

Discussions proceeded to

address each subject, one by one, until a settlement or
partial agreement was reached for allowable discharges of
TSS and BOD, and seasonal river flow and temperature cutoff
thresholds for direct discharge.

Stone proposed a change in

compliance procedures for the color standard, allowing
calculation of color change based on discharge rate and
effluent color content, to replace the inconsistent means of
measuring instream color during spring runoff periods.
Coalition representatives endorsed

their

The

request,

conditional on Water Quality Bureau approval of the change
and maintenance of the color standard itself.
The issue of nutrient loading was also left partially
unresolved, with a general agreement for DHES to prepare a
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draft of nutrient permit language for review, based on the
ideas espoused by Stone and

the Coalition.

There was

substantive agreement to minimize the application of
nutrients to the treatment system (nutrients were added to
promote waste treatment in a biological process) by 1988,
and to conduct engineering studies to assess alternatives
means of reducing nutrients further.

The parties agreed to

engage in further talks, if necessary, to address the DHES1
draft permit language on nutrients.
All of the major topics of disagreement had been
addressed.

An atmosphere of optimism filled the room as the

Coalition and DHES staff felt that a substantial agreement
had been reached, and that remaining details would be minor
and easily resolved.

But that optimism was shattered as, in

the closing moments of the meeting, Stone representatives
renewed their challenge of the entire process and cast
serious doubts on what had been accomplished through
negotiations.
A few days following the meeting, the Coalition wrote
to Stone, expressing great disappointment over the apparent
impasse on the subject of process, following a very
productive day of discussing permit terms.

"It seems

that we could chart a course which will result in a
reasonable, non-confrontational solution to the issue," the
group wrote.

The Coalition sensed a deep distrust of

conservationist motives for the settlement, "...perhaps (you
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are) worried that somehow we will change our minds along the
way, or that we will use this example as an opportunity to
take some underhanded digs at Stone or the Water Quality
Bureau," the Coalition suggested.

The group assured Stone,

in writing, that they would not pressure the Board of Health
for further restrictions beyond those agreed to at the
meeting, and

the permit language left to be resolved

pertaining to nutrients, as long as Stone would go along
with the process as presented by DHES.

And the Coalition

assured Stone that they would not go out of their way to
make anyone look bad when the issue was over, that they
would in fact be happy to see the Water Quality Bureau and
mill come out with a positive public image.

"(We) hope that

Stone will see fit to continue to participate in the
cooperative atmosphere established at our meeting, and to
seek an acceptable solution to this issue," the Coalition
stated.
The Coalition had, in effect, gone out of their way to
assure Stone that they would not double cross them, or hurt
their public image following a settlement.

The group was

interested in preserving relationships of trust and respect
that had been established over a long period of time.

They

would not burn their bridges when it was all over.
Stone, apparently, became convinced that DHES would not
concede to its arguments over the process, and that the
Coalition could be trusted.
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Stone continued to participate

in discussions to settle the permit issue.
On July 3, DHES mailed another draft compromise permit
to Stone and

the Coalition for their review.

With

relatively minor exceptions, Stone expressed agreement with
the compromise conditions.

But the Coalition was still

unhappy with the language pertaining to nutrients.

Despite

efforts to agree on the issue at the June 25 meeting,
specific permit language was not drafted by the negotiating
parties.

As a result, the DHES was left in the middle to

make a judgement based on the ideas expressed by both
parties.
did not.

Stone found the language acceptable, the Coalition
The issue of nutrient loading, which was of

primary concern to downstream residents along the river and
Lake Pend Oreille, remained unresolved.

It was the only

major stumbling block to the completion of an agreement, and
as is often the case, the last point was one of the most
difficult issues to deal with.
Further talks were agreed to by Stone Container's Dan
Potts, and the Coalition's Board of Directors.

This time

they would be conducted without the DHES, and would be held
at the Frenchtown mill on July 18.

Dan Potts, Larry Weeks,

Jack Tohulske and the author met for over three hours,
addressing only the issue of nutrients for the compromise
conditions.

Following numerous drafts and re-drafts of

permit language, Stone Container and the Coalition agreed on
a one page statement on nutrients, stipulating a goal to
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return total nutrient loading to the river to levels
approximate to those discharged before 1983 , by no later
than 1991.

If the goal was not reached, the mill would have

to go back to the Board of Health to appeal the nutrient
condition before issuance of a new permit.

The statement

was attached to a joint letter signed by the two parties and
mailed to the Water Quality Bureau, requesting it be
considered for inclusion in the compromise conditions.
The last remaining hurdle had been crossed. All that
was left was to secure approval from the state, from the
Board of Directors of both parties, and significantly, from
the public.
Before the permit negotiations had been finalized, the
Coalition had scheduled a public meeting to be held in
Sandpoint, Idaho on July 23.

Sincere efforts had been made

by all parties to not leak information to the news media or
others concerning the negotiations until they were final.
But the upcoming meeting in Sandpoint, whose citizens had
provided some of the most stern opposition to the pulp mill
discharge in the past, would make it quite difficult to keep
the story quiet.

The Coalition's Board of Directors was

anxious to present the terms of the agreement to its rank
and file.

The Sandpoint audience would provide a good

litmus test of public sentiment.

But the agreement would

not be final until the Water Quality Bureau had reviewed and
accepted its terms.

The Coalition urged the Bureau to make
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their announcement prior to the July 23 meeting.

The

pressure was on, and the public meeting was driving the
process.
The Department of Health and Environmental Sciences
issued a news release

on July 23, announcing their decision

to deny the mill's expanded permit, and to cooperate in
discussions for a compromise agreement to be presented to
the Board of Health for final approval.

DHES announced that

citizen comments raised during the addendum review process
had, "....for the first time, squarely raised the issue of
the respective roles of the DHES and the State Board of
Health

and

Environmental Sciences (BOH) under

the

nondegradation section of the Montana Water Quality Act."
The agency said they would release a Final EIS recommending
that the company's request for a long-term extension of
relaxed permit conditions be denied, and that a public
hearing would be held on this decision on August 28.

The

news release went on to point out that Stone would have the
option of appealing the decision under the procedures
outlined in the nondegradation rules. "In anticipation of
such an appeal, representatives of the environmental
community, Stone, the Governor's Clark Fork Coordination
Project and DHES have initiated discussions intended to
allow the company to seek revised permit conditions that
would have a broad base of support before the Board," DHES
said.

The Department stopped short of announcing the terms
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negotiated by Stone and the Coalition.
But

the

detail during
Nielsen and

Coalition

discussed

that evening's

Dr. Vicki

the

draft

EIS

through

pointed out that

the

meeting in

Watson of

described the entire course

those terms in complete
Sandpoint.

Peter

the University of Montana

of events

from the

release of

the negotiations with Stone.

Water

Quality

Bureau

had

They

made the

difficult admission that it lacked the authority to make the
decision it had
Quality Bureau

proposed
had to

hard for anyone to do,
conditions

negotiated

as

the

1982

absolutely

and

clear

on

as

1983.

The Water

admit that it was wrong, and that is
the

group

with

presented to the audience in
both

early

1984

said.

Stone
a

what

were

handout

permits,
had

Proposed permit

so

been

described,

comparing
everyone

and

them to
would be

accomplished.

The

spokespersons stated their belief that the compromise permit
conditions actually would be
straight rollback

to 1982

better, in

some ways,

than a

conditions - principally because

of the new condition pertaining to nutrients.
The

Coalition's

breath, and

waited to

representatives

then

hear the reaction.

be going pretty well during the meeting.
confident
basis.

they

could

defend

a

deep

Things seemed to
The Coalition was

the agreement on a technical

But there was no guaranty.

The audience responded
senior

took

environmental

with

specialist
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praise.

Mike Beckwith,

for the Idaho Division of

Environment congratulated the Coalition for doing " a
fabulous job" in working out the compromise.

Others in the

audience enthusiastically agreed, as a lively and upbeat
discussion of the apparent victory shifted into other areas
of pollution concerns.

"If we have no one else to blame, we

will have to look to ourselves and our unsewered areas,"
Beckwith told the audience as discussions

carried on

concerning the need for better local pollution controls and
more ambitious government studies to document pollution
problems.
The positive reaction of Sandpoint citizens was
encouraging for the Coalition.

Although many hurdles

remained to be crossed before the Board of Health could
review the compromise agreement, no earlier than November,
momentum had been established.

The prospects for settlement

were bright.
The next item of business was the release of the
state's Final EIS and tentative "nondegradation" permit.
This would be followed by the August 28 public hearing.
Fifteen days after the hearing, D H E S would

issue the

nondegradation permit reflecting 1982 discharge conditions.
Stone then would have 30 days to appeal the terms of that
permit, in a petition for amendments to the Board of Health.
The Board would review the petition in September, to assure
completeness and determine whether further environmental
review was necessary.

A public hearing would be held in
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November, if all went as planned, followed by a final Board
decision.
The August public hearing went well, as conservation
groups

supported

the

state's

revised

stance

on

nondegradation, and speakers from both sides applauded
efforts to negotiate a settlement.

The hearing served as a

means to inform citizens about the issues and the terms of
the proposed settlement.

The Stone/Coalition agreement was

portrayed by many speakers, including David Owen of the
Missoula Chamber of Commerce, as a "win - win" situation for
both sides, with both the mill and river advocates gaining
something through the proposition.

Some speakers, including

Mike Micone of the Western Environmental Trade Association,
expressed feelings of sour grapes, claiming that the mill
had been treated unfairly and subjected to extreme scrutiny
by the DHES and environmentalists.
DHES issued the nondegradation permit.
On September 10, 1986 Stone Container and the Clark
Fork Coalition sent a letter signed by the author and mill
manager Dan Potts to the Water Quality Bureau, m a k i n g
several minor modifications to the compromise permit
conditions, and closing the book on these negotiations.
"With the above changes, the Clark Fork Coalition and Stone
Container have reached final agreement on the proposed
Compromise Conditions for Stone's discharge permit,"
letter stated.
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the

The

stage

was

set

for

Stone

nondegradation permit, requesting the
with the

Coalition.

to

appeal

amendments negotiated

They had thirty days to do it, but the

next Board of Health meeting was September 26.
existence

of

requirements

administrative

since

1982,

were

examples

detailed

to

use

Despite the

specifying

petition

nondegradation petition

The requirements set forth in the

and

in

rules

Stone's

would be Montana's first.
rules

the

comprehensive.

Stone

had

preparation of their petition.

no

Their

first draft would be nearly 100 pages in length.
As the company proceeded to prepare

the petition, both

sides agreed that there could be ample room for disagreement
over the arguments presented, and the

data used

their claims

The petition would be

for permit

an important instrument
rationale behind
and the public.
to disrupt

amendments.
for

both

the permit

parties,

changes to the Board of Health

But the Coalition stated, at the

August hearing, that it would withdraw

petition.

if

Stone

This was,

petition ever

explaining the

Neither party wanted the petition's content

the agreement.

compromise

to back up

submitted

after

all,

a

faulty

the

submitted in Montana.

its support
or

incomplete

first nondegradation

The conservation group

did not want the mill to be relieved of its duty to
appropriate

petition

to

the

Board,

just

struck an agreement with its opposition.
Coalition's

unqualified

support
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as

for the

because it had

Stone

crucial

file an

viewed the
in

order to

receive

approval

from

the

Board

of Health.

approaching deadline of September 26, the

With a fast

parties agreed to

further talks.
Stone provided
review.

a draft

petition to

To the conservation group's

the Coalition for

amazement, the company

had included a nine page section in the document, drafted by
their attorney, challenging the entire process.
time the
motion

group was notified that/ Stone's attorney had filed

for

rehearing

Environmental

to

the

Sciences.

Department

These

of

moves

preserve

Although the
their

group understood

options

should

the

Health

angered

conservation group at a particularly sensitive
process.

At the same

and
the

point in the

Stone's intent to

deal

fall

through,

relations between the parties were damaged and the Coalition
wondered if they could ever fully trust the company.
The

Coalition

attorney, Jack

retained

the

services

of

own

Tohulske, and combed the petition for flaws.

They requested a meeting with Stone to review
and when

their

it occurred,

Tohulske and

the petition,

the author presented a

series of complaints concerning the content of the document.
While the initial talks were handled by focusing on the
permit conditions alone, these discussions were
areas of
on

the

deep disagreement between the parties.
Coalition's

list

of

complaints

was

forced into
Number one
the section

challenging the entire process and requesting that the Board
dismiss the case.

If that

section was
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not removed

in its

entirety, and numerous other statements not removed or
tempered substantially, the group said it would withdraw its
support of the petition.

The entire agreement was more

vulnerable than it had been at any time since June 25.
ball was in Stone's court.

The

Would they respond?

A few days later the Coalition received another draft
petition.

This time, the section challenging the process

was gone, and most of the disputed statements had been
revised or removed.

Tohulske and several members of the

Coalition's advisory committee reviewed
carefully, and found

the document

that they could not agree with

everything it stated, but that Stone had made a sincere
effort to eliminate inaccuracies and to moderate statements
disputed by the conservation group.

A major confrontation

had been averted.
On September 26, Stone presented its petition for
amendments to the Montana Board of Health and Environmental
Sciences.

The Coalition and the Department endorsed it as

complete under the requirements of the nondegradation rules.
The Board scheduled a public hearing on the petition for
November 14, 1986.

THE PULP MILL GETS A PERMIT

Stone Container and the Coalition went into the
November 14 public hearing in support of the same proposal.
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The

two

parties

had

even

negotiations, on the eve of the
proposed

"Findings

of

Fact,

engaged

in

last

public hearing,

minute

to draft a

Conclusions of Law and Final

Order" to submit for Board approval, should the petition for
amendment be approved.

In contrast to all previous hearings

on this controversial issue,
and groups
Board.

made the

only a

trip to

handful of individuals

Helena to

testify before the

The Board listened in astonishment as

speaker

came

forth

to

support

the

speaker after

petition

for permit

changes.
Stone Container told the board, "It's been a very, very
long road

for us.

We

believe the modified permit will be

beneficial to the company and to the Clark Fork River."
The Coalition was represented
Nielsen,

Vicki

Watson,

and

testimony filed with the
requested amendments
providing new

at the

Jack

hearing by Peter

Tohulske.

Board, the

In pre-filed

Coalition stated, "The

will allow economic development, while

permit

permit which

is, on

old permit.

This

conditions

which

will

result

in a

balance, as good as or better than the

is

a

balancing

of

public interests."

Vicki Watson agreed that the proposed permit was technically
sound

and

endorsed

superior
the

case

to
as

nondegradation rules.

the

original

Montana's

Tohulske

permit.

She also

first application of its

stated that

Board approval

of the proposed permit amendments would demonstrate that the
nondegradation policy can work, and it
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can provide

a layer

of protection for aquatic resources.
"Nondegradation could no longer be portrayed as a "nogrowth" policy, but rather as a "pro-growth" policy due to
its ability to protect the interests of the pulp mill and
the river, which are both valuable economic resources for
the region," the group said.
The petition also received support from an unusual
alliance of groups and agencies, ranging from the Sierra
Club, to the League of Women Voters, to the Idaho and
Montana Fish and Game Departments, to the Missoula Health
Department, to the Montana Wood Products Association and
Western Environmental Trade Association.

No one spoke in

opposition.
When the testimony was complete, one Board member said,
"Is that it?

There's really no opposition?"

Attorney

Howard Toole, a board member from Missoula, began to ask
some tough questions on procedural issues, which ignited a
brief display of posturing and browbeating by the attorneys
from Stone, the Coalition and DHES.

But Board member Ed

Zaidlecz, of Billings, seemed to recognize the significance
of efforts to reconcile disputes on the most relevant
issues, while casting aside differences in opinion over
technical or procedural issues.

"Let's hurry up and approve

this thing before somebody changes their mind," he said.
After commending DHES attorney Frank Crowley for his
considerable efforts to bring the compromise package

together,

the

board

voted

unanimously to approve Stone's

petition for amendment.
On

December

5r

1986

Environmental Sciences

the

Department

modified the

wastewater discharge permit in

of

Health and

Frenchtown pulp mill's

accordance with

the Board's

decision.
********

In 1987, thirteen years following state approval of the
expansion permit, Stone Container
million

color

pulp mill.
treatment

removal

The

treatment

system

capabilities

system failed, and to
pulp production.

would
lost

install a $3

system at the Frenchtown

allow
when

increase

The

proposed to

the

the

its

mill

to replace

rapid infiltration

flexibility

in bleach

mill presented its proposal up front

to the DHES and the Clark Fork Coalition, and worked closely
with potential

critics to resolve their concerns.

conducted a bioassay study
plant to

of effluent

assess potential toxicity.

treated in

to

attempt

to

resolve

approve

restrictions
monitoring

the
on

new

system,

allowable

efficiently, and responsibly.
installed in the fall of 1987.
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but

discharge

requirements.

The

scheduled a

the group's concerns.

agreement was reached between Stone, the
to

a pilot

When the CFC disagreed

with some of this study's conclusions, the mill
meeting

The mill

Coalition and DHES
to

impose

dilution

matter

The new

An

was

certain

ratios and
handled

treatment system was

CONCLUSION

The

Frenchtown

pulp

Clark Fork River in 1957
environmental
decisions

review,

affecting

mill

opened on the banks of the

without

planning

the

the

benefit

of thorough

or public participation in

quality

of

the

river's aquatic

resources.

Fish kills and other serious impacts to aquatic

life caused

considerable

years.

uproar

the

mill's first

An atmosphere of confrontation and mistrust led to a

form of decision-making by
outcry, the
in

during

1958,

crisis.

In

reaction

to public

mill installed its first waste treatment system

and

functions in

the

state

1962.

finally

assumed

The company's

its regulatory

inability to live up to

the promises and pledges of its boosters, for both water and
air pollution

control, got

foot in western Montana.
lasting

bitterness

the pulp

mill off on the wrong

The events of this period caused a

among

conservationists

and

many area

residents.
During

the

decade

environmental laws

of

the

1970's

a

host

of

new

and regulations were passed, and applied

to an old plant with a

history of

problems.

Environmental

advocates were zealous in their use of new found power under
these

government

against

procedures.

conservation

obstructionists

and

interests,

Industry

characterizing

extremists.

environmentalists attempted
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backers

railed
them

Undaunted,

as
the

to use every possible legal and

procedural

device

to create delays or

impose

restrictions before allowing the proposed expansion.

new

State

agencies, on the other hand, seemed resistant to change.
They weren't used to the newly proscribed role of the public
in decision-making, and seemed to view citizen input as a
threat to their power and authority.
decisions were

As a result, many

poorly handled, and

relations with

conservationists were further polarized.

The mill was

permitted to expand despite a majority of public comments
asking for a temporary delay.

Additional wastewater

disposal needs would be handled, in part, by an experimental
disposal system.

If it failed, the state pledged, an

alternative means of treatment would be required.

Despite a

protracted battle over the issue of the delay, the mill made
their own decision to postpone the expansion for two years.
In 1983 the mill asked for permission to increase its
direct discharge to the river instead of replacing the
experimental disposal system, which had failed.

The

regulatory agency seemed to forget the pledges made, almost
ten years earlier, to require a replacement system.

The

agency mis-gauged changing public values toward the river
and the lake into which it flowed.

When the state proposed

to allow the mill's increased discharge, an explosive
confrontation resulted as a broad range of public interests
united to fight the decision.
This case study illustrates what can occur when poor
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planning is coupled with changing societal values and a
decision-making process which is better equipped

to

perpetuate conflicts than to resolve them.
Inadequate planning for water quality protection and
wastewater treatment dates back to the early 1950'sf when
the Clark Fork River below Missoula was first considered as
a pulp mill site.

As the mill expanded, water quality

resource planning was always a step behind the development.
When the mill conducted its largest expansion ever, in the
1970's, an experimental disposal system was approved, but
there was no serious effort to plan for the contingency that
the system might fail.
During the mill's first two decades of operations the
Clark Fork River was not a highly valued public resource.
Its waters were used as a cheap and convenient means to rid
society of its wastes.

Mining and smelting industries in

the headwaters had, for nearly a century, been more intent
on disemboweling the earth of its mineral riches than
protecting the quality of downstream, aquatic resources.
Garbage was heaped on the river's banks and swept away with
each spring's snowmelt.

Junk auto bodies were strewn along

riverbanks to protect against floods.

Raw sewage was dumped

into the river by every community along its length.

The

river carried the burden of our refuse and our disregard,
and little else.

Even the buildings on Missoula's Front

Street faced the other way.
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But new laws and rules were passed in the 1960's and
1970's to protect and improve water quality.

Sewage plants

were built, better treatment systems were required at the
copper mines and the pulp mill.

Garbage dumps were cleaned

up.
The river responded, cleansing itself of much of its
past disregard.

People began to make more use of the river,

take more pride in it.

Recreational access sites and

riverfront parks sprang up.

Suddenly it became a focal

point for our communities - a front yard, no longer a back
alley.
When the mill and the state water pollution control
agency proposed to allow more waste discharge into the Clark
Fork River, people were concerned that we were beginning to
lose ground again, that we were turning back the hands of
time on the outstanding progress made toward reclaiming the
river.

The proposal spurred a public outcry of massive

proportions.

Citizens and groups representing diverse

interests came forth to speak on behalf of the river and the
lake.

It wasn't just the same old group of environmental

enthusiasts any more - there were property owners, business
groups, environmentalists, sportsmen, and a lot of old
timers who remembered the Clark Fork that was.
The issue became as controversial and confrontational
as any conservation problem ever witnessed
Montana.

in western

Opposing factions were deeply divided, and rarely
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communicated with each other outside of the media and
officially sanctioned public hearings.

Some hearings became

grandstanding events, as the participants engaged in name
calling, and shouting matches, only serving to perpetuate
the conflict.
The case study clearly demonstrates basic flaws in the
way we go about making controversial natural resource
decisions.

Environmental issues are among the most

confrontational matters dealt with

by

government.

Conservation groups and industry backers tend to stand off
in their respective camps and take their best shots at each
other while leaving the decision making authority in the
hands of the government.

Michael Sandell, a political

theorist from Harvard, refers to our decision structure as
the "procedural republic and the unencumbered self."

We

have a complex set of procedural rules to guide the
responsible agency in these issues.
republic.

This is the procedural

The procedures are designed to guarantee everyone

the right to public notice and the right to be heard on
matters which affect their basic rights.

But the only party

who is burdened to hear citizen comments is the responsible
agency.

Public hearings are designed to allow everyone an

opportunity to speak their mind.

But the testifiers at

these hearings are not encumbered with the responsibility to
make decisions.

This is the unencumbered self.

There are

no rules governing accuracy or fairness in public testimony.
153

No rules allowing a disagreeing party to respond.

No

requirements that opposing parties speak to each other, or
hear each other.

The only party who must listen is the

hearing officer, representing the responsible agency which
is stuck in the middle, trying to make sense out of what
they hear and to make a decision in the best public
interest.

This decision, if it involves a compromise, has

the unique quality of never actually being advocated by any
of the contestants.

This is a cumbersome and inefficient

way of doing government business on natural resource issues.
Opposing factions spend considerable effort and funds
fighting each other and making their best case to the
agency.

If they don't agree with the decision, they can

appeal it, or go to court, costing more time and money.

The

opponents then may go through the motions again in court,
before the judge decides in favor of one of the contestants,
or a settlement is reached.
The most recent episode of controversy at the
Frenchtown pulp mill started out this way.

Public hearings

were held in early 1986, and both factions organized a
sequence of expert witnesses to make their best case before
the Department of Health and Environmental Sciences.
Department was placed
interpreting all of the

The

in the difficult position of
evidence and making a decision

consistent with the laws and regulations it was charged to
uphold, and reflecting the best public interest.
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The

opposing parties rarely agreed with the DHES' decisions.
But in

this case,

the opponents made a sincere effort

to communicate with

each

settlement

reached

between

company.

The

forums

and

framework

meetings

opponents to break down
most natural
and after

other,

conservation

of

advisory

initiated

relationship of

by

some of

resource issues.

a long

beginning

period of

with

groups

the 1984
and

the

committees, public

this agreement allowed

the barriers

prevalent in

A dialogue was established,

time, the

parties developed a

guarded trust and respect.

Stone Container

and the Clark Fork Coalition began to challenge the premises
of the procedural republic.

The parties took a more serious

responsibility to communicate with

each

other

and resolve

conflicts.
This course

of events

may have

deep threat to the bureaucracy,
authority to

citizens and

a

been interpreted as a

surrender

of

private interests.

power and

But in this

case the Department of Health and Environmental Sciences was
willing to

go to

the extra

trouble, assume the additional

risks, and not only allow, but carefully assist the opposing
parties

as

they

attempted

Although the Department
surrender its

firmly

resolve their differences.
stated

that

it

would not

authority or responsibility to make the final

decision on this issue,
directly in

to

and that

negotiations, it

said, reflecting on the

case
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it would

cooperated.
a

year

not participate
As Steve Pilcher

after

the

Board of

Health issued its final decision, "There comes a time when
you have to put pride and the past behind you, and be
willing to sit down and discuss the issues openly with your
critics."
The 1986 resolution of the wastewater permit issue for
the Frenchtown pulp mill was viewed as a huge success by all
participants.

Both the company and river advocates said

they were not only pleased with the result, but that they
had gained more than they had lost.

Endless appeals of

agency decisions, and lawsuits were avoided.
costs were reduced.

Government

Relationships were established which

both parties agreed would allow a more efficient discussion
of future water quality issues.

Both the industry and the

conservation group expressed hopes that the positive
relationships would continue, and that other groups and
industries would note the advantages of the approach they
had taken.
If other groups and industries wish to employ the
techniques of conflict resolution on natural resource
issues, they must carefully examine what it takes to get to
the point where it is possible, and what must be done to
avoid the pitfalls.

This case study provides some real

world examples which help answer those questions.
First comes the question of what is necessary to get
there.

In this case study, it was revealed that both sides

first engaged

in lengthy confrontations within the
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traditional decision-making

procedures of government before

serious talks were initiated to resolve
school

of

thought

maintains

this case lasted for

nearly

perhaps necessary.

As

at

each

other,

serious reality

One

that this exercise, which in

three

years,

is unavoidable,

Board of Health member Howard Toole

points out, the public hearing process
have

the conflict.

vent

testing.

their

allows each

side to

emotions, and engage in

Each side

of the

issue has the

opportunity, though no obligation, to better understand each
other's perspective, compare
own

positions.

"Without

process, any negotiations
What's important,
such a
are not

burned.

the

may

he adds,

manner that

viewpoints,

and

cathartic

be

public

stillborn,"

is that

revise their

Toole says.

the parties

relationships are

hearing

engage in

not damaged, bridges

If this is not done, conflicts may become

so deeply seated that the parties are simply

unable to talk

to one another when the time for negotiations arrives.
Missoula

City

Councilman

admit we're never going
fight,

Dan

to reach
how

Kemmis

Nirvana.

the

question

is

should keep

in mind,

when fighting

agrees, "Let's
We're going to

do we conduct our fight.

We

these natural resource

battles, that today's fight is not the last chapter - we may
see each other tomorrow," Kemmis said.
But Kemmis does not

agree that

confrontations need to

proceed for the length of time presented in this case study.
"Consensus works," Kemmis says, "whenever both
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sides attain

a roughly even balance of power."
This case study shows the value of preserving, and
developing positive relationships with the opposition at the
same time that confrontational battles are being waged.

If

the Clark Fork Coalition, Stone, and the Water Quality
Bureau had not been so careful to avoid damaging public
statements, to build trust and respect, and to understand
each other's position, the consensus process may have never
occurred.
talk.

In the end, the parties were able to sit down and

But serious efforts to resolve the issue to

everyone's satisfaction would not have occurred had the
opposing parties not attained a roughly even balance of
power.

From the perspective of a conservationist involved

in the process, this even balance of power was not attained
until

the Department

reversed

their decision, and

recommended a denial of the mill's request.

If this had not

occurred, it is doubtful if the mill would have had enough
incentive to settle the issue in the.manner which they did.
The Department's decision was the club the Coalition needed
to gain speedy concessions on important issues, and to
arrive at a settlement that would be supported

by its

constituents.
It is also worthwhile to consider some problems with
the consensus process, as applied in this case study.
parties who engaged

All

in the talks assumed significant

personal and organizational risks.
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The process must somehow

become widely

accepted or

institutionalized to avoid these

risks, or its use will be
the

participants,

severely limited.

particularly

were forced to assume a dual
zealously

represent

the

constituents, but at the

those

role.

from the Coalition,

They

immediate

same

time

Additionally,

had

the

interests
to

seek

process,

and

mediator.
but it
be

was

their

The agency

power through the

to assume an official role of

assumed this

role, to

an extent,

was an uncomfortable position, and one not likely to

situations.

the

services.

repeated

way

issue

to
of

other

provide
who

in

similar

A

benefit the

pay

mediators.

This

for the mediator's

penalties for

standards

general fund.

which would

groups

neutral

should

At this time, civil

environmental

the state

by

If we wish to encourage the consensus process,

we must find a

state

reluctant

The Coalition

consistently

raises

of bureaucratic

of

a compromise

which would represent their long-term interests.
faced the risk of a loss

duty to

violations of

and discharge permits go to

more appropriate

use, and one

resource , would be to establish a

mediation fund with a portion of these penalties.
Its also worth noting that conservation
undeniable

stake

in

conflict.

memberships, and raise money.
of

losing

memberships

Stone, not only because
unhappy with

by

the result,

Controversial issues build

The Coalition assumed

engaging

some

people

but because
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groups have an

in

a risk

negotiations with

would

undoubtably be

they were doing away

with their

hottest issue - the one that got them started in

the first place.
with

adequate

technical

How

can

funding

analysis

to

on

consensus building

we

provide

perform

such

conservation groups

the necessary level of

issues,

and

to

engage

in

processes to resolve the issues, if they

will lose members and financial support in the process?

Can

we really expect groups to maintain the level of involvement
displayed in this case study over a long period of time?
It is
changes in

possible.
the way

But groups

they operate

themselves to the public.
groups has

The

will have
and the

been committed to fighting the battles for clean

their constituencies,

and to

the

fear

of

There

certainly

conservation

groups

which

involvement

constituency which

But

losing

suppport.

public

The groups

is

displayed

groups

is

a

this

public behavior,

financial

in

case

for

the type of
study

—

a

is attracted to resolving controversies,

groups and

this form of public

and

not be

constituency

interested
in

should

members

not just the controversies themselves.
for conservation

are tied to

the battles that help attract

members and financial support.
by

way they present

constituency of conservation

air and clean water for many years.

deterred

to make broad

conduct

and to

The shift could involve

The challenge, then,

all others who have a stake in
is

to

foster

this

shift in

challenge the procedural republic.
big

changes

in

the

public decisions on natural resource issues.
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way

we make
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Appendix A: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1951
U.S. Public Health Service publishes first report on
pulp mill sites in Montana.
1955
U.S. Public Health Service publishes second report on
pulp mill sites, including the Clark Fork River below
Missoula.
1956
U.S. Congress enacts
Act

Federal

Water

Pollution Control

1957
Waldorf Paper Company opens Frenchtown pulp mill, with
capacity of 250 tons per day. No waste treatment system
installed.
1958
First fish kill occurs in the Clark Fork River in
August.
Mill's first
settling ponds constructed
following fish kill, providing waste storage.
1960
First Expansion of production at Frenchtown mill, from
250 TPD to 450 TPD.
1961
Second fish
September.

kill

occurs

in

Clark

Fork

River

in

1962
Montana Board of Health negotiates first discharge
conditions with pulp mill prior to a spring discharge
season.
1965
U.S. Congress enacts the Water Quality Act.
1966
Waldorf Paper Products merges with Hoerner Boxes to
form Hoerner-Waldorf Corporation.
1967
Montana Legislature enacts
Act.

the

Montana

Water Quality

1968
Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences
issues first
Wastewater Discharge
Permit to the
Frenchtown Mill.
1970
U.S. Congress enacts National Environmental Policy Act.
Frenchtown mill adds primary clarifier to wastewater
treatment system.
1971
Montana Legislature enacts Montana Environmental Policy
Act, and
amends Water Quality Act to include a
nondegradation policy.
1972
Board of

Health

establishes
162

compliance

schedule for

Frenchtown mill to install secondary aeration treatment
system (Best Practicable Control Technology).
U.S. Congress enacts Water Pollution Control Act,
originating NPDES permit system.
1973
Montana legislature amends Water Pollution Control Act
to broaden enforcement capabilities and allow state to
implement MPDES permit system.
Hoerner-Waldorf announces two-phase expansion proposal
to increase production from 1,150 TPD to 1,850 TPD.
Mill experiments with rapid
infiltration disposal
system.
DHES grants permit variance due to low river flows,
allowing increased discharges from the mill.
Concerned Citizens for a Quality Environment forms.
1974
EPA holds public hearing on first NPDES permit
DHES prepares EIS on proposed expansion, holds public
hearings.
State assumes MPDES permit authority from the EPA.
DHES grants expansion permit.
1975
Mill installs secondary treatment, aeration basins.
1976
Phase I expansion begins at mill. 120 acres of rapid
infiltration
basins
handling
63%
of wastewater
disposal.
1977
Champion International Corporation merges with HoernerWaldorf.
Rapid infiltration basin plugging first detected.
1978
Phase II of expansion begins
1979
DHES grants permit variance to discharge wastes at
river flows as low as 4,000 cfs, down from 10,000 cfs.
1980
Phase II expansion complete.
1981
DHES grants another permit variance allowing discharges
below
4,000
cfs,
with
additional
monitoring
requirements for dissolved oxygen in the river.
1982
Board of Health and
administrative
rules
policy.

Environmental Sciences adopts
to
implement nondegradation

1983
Champion
International
applies
for a year-round
discharge permit with liberalized permit conditions.
Rapid infiltration system allowing disposal of only 14%
of mill's waste.
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DHES
prepares
Preliminary
Environmental
Review,
proposes to grant most of Champion's request, and holds
a public hearing in Missoula. Variety of groups call
for studies and EIS.
1984
DHES postpones final decision on permit, and revises
its PER in January and March.
Champion International and conservation groups sign a
Memorandum of Agreement, allowing increased discharge
for two years and establishing special studies and a
technical advisory committee.
DHES grants two year permit, agrees to fund intensive
studies,
and
to
prepare
an EIS before permit
reissuance.
1985
Clark Fork Coalition incorporates
Champion International agrees to
to Stone Container Corporation
million transaction.
DHES releases draft EIS.

sell Frenchtown mill
as part of a $457

1986
State holds public hearing on draft EIS, and agrees to
prepare an addendum
Clark Fork Coalition prepares Citizens* Alternative
DHES holds
public hearing on addendum, postpones
decision.
Clark Fork Coalition and Stone Container negotiate
compromise conditions.
DHES denies request for increased discharge, holds a
public hearing on nondegradation permit.
Stone appeals decision to Board of Health, presents
negotiated conditions in its petition
Board of Health holds public hearing on negotiated
conditions, and unanimously approves the request.
1987
Stone Container Corporation installs color
treatment system at the Frenchtown pulp mill.
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APPENDIX B: Cast of Characters
This appendix lists names of individuals who are
cited, or who played a pivotal role in this case
study, followed by a date representing the period
in which they were most involved in the Frenchtown
pulp mill issue.
CITIZEN GROUPS
Western Montana Fish and Game Association (1957-62)
Don Aldrich, member
Bill Bush, President
Les Pengelly, Member, Director Montana State University
Wildlife Extension Unit.
Concerned Citizens for a Quality Environment (1973-74)
Ron Erickson, professor of Chemistry and Environmental
Studies, University of Montana
Gail Owen, free lance writer
Clancy
Gordon,
Director
of
the
Department of
Environmental Studies, University of Montana
Robert Curry, Professor of Geology, University of
Montana
Dexter Roberts, professor of English, University of
Montana
Jim Carlson, Environmental Studies Graduate Student,
University of Montana.
Jim Goetz, attorney
Clark Fork Technical Advisory Committee (1984-86)
Richard Solberg, University of Montana, Chair
Larry
Weeks,
Technical
Director,
Champion
International/Stone Container
Merle Hutchison, Idaho Wildlife Federation
Greg Munther, Trout Unlimited
Don Willems, DHES
Vicki
Watson,
Montana
Environmental
Information
Center/Clark
Fork Coalition
Jim Carlson, Missoula City/County Health Department
Pat Graham, or Dennis Workman, or Rod Berg, Department
of Fish, Wildlife and Parks
Ed Tullock, or Mike Beckwith, Idaho
Division of
Environment
Mike Falter, University of Idaho, for Green Monarch
Coalition
Governor Schwinden's Citizens' Advisory Council (1985)
Brace Hayden, Clark Fork River Basin Project
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Howard Johnson, Clark Fork River Basin Project
Ken Knudson, Clark Fork River Basin Project
Ernie Corrick, Champion International
Tom Cznich, Anaconda, MT
Karl Englund, attorney, Missoula MT
John Henson, Superior MT
Greg Munther, Trout Unlimited
Bill Murphy, Rancher, Garrison MT
Don Peoples, Butte-Silver Bow local Government
Clarence Popham, Corvallis MT
Dave Suhr, ASARCO Inc.
Tim Williamson, Clark Fork Coalition
Jim Windorski, Anaconda Minerals Company
Clark Fork Coalition Pulp Mill Advisory Committee (1986)
Peter Nielsen, Executive Director
Vicki Watson, University of Montana
Greg Munther, Trout Unlimited
Jim Curtis, Sierra Club
Marty Onishuk, League of Women Voters
Ron Erickson, University of Montana
Dennis Workman, Clark Fork Coalition
Tom France, National Wildlife Federation
Jack Poulson, Northern Rockies Natural Resource Law
Clinic
Tim Williamson, Clark Fork Coalition
Jack Tohulske, attorney
Clark Fork Coalition Board of Directors (1986)
Kathy Hadley, Deer Lodge MT
Carleen Gonder, Huson MT
Dennis Workman, Frenchtown MT
Sam Burgess, Superior MT
Tim Williamson, Plains MT
Judy Hutchins, Heron MT
Mike Demarco, Sandpoint ID
John Camp, Hope ID
Ruth Watkins, Sandpoint ID
Don Stoecker, Georgetown Lake MT
Fred Runkel, Spokane WA
Ron Snyder, Missoula MT
Dave Harriman, St. Ignatius MT
FRENCHTOWN PULP MILL
Waldorf Paper Company (1957-1966)
Nels Sandberg,
Co.

Executive Vice
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President Waldorf Paper

Hoerner-Waldorf Company (1966-1977)
Roy Countryman, Resident Mill Manager
Dan Potts, Assistant Mil Manager
Larry Weeks, Technical Director
Champion International Corporation (1977-1986)
Bob Kelly, Public Relations
Dan Potts, Mill Manager
Larry Weeks, Technical Director
Dr. Al Wallace, University of Idaho, Consultant
Stone Container Corporation
Dan Potts, Mill Manager
Larry Weeks, Technical Director
Curt Barton, Wastewater Treatment Specialist
Russ Frye, attorney
STATE AGENCIES
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME (1957-1974)
Walter F. Allen, Superintendent of Fisheries (1957-62)
Bob Averett, biologist (1961)
Ralph Boland, Chief, Environmental Bureau (1973-74)
Boyd Opheim, (1973)
Jim Posewitz, (1973)
John Spindler, Pollution Control Biologist, 1957-62
Art Whitney, Fisheries Biologist, 1961
Wesley Woodgerd, Director, 1974-74
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS (1983-86)
Rod Berg, Clark Fork Fisheries Study Director
James Flynn, Director
Glenn Phillips, Pollution Control Biologist
Dennis Workman, Regional Fisheries Manager
MONTANA BOARD OF HEALTH
Claiborne W. Brinck, Director Division of Environmental
Sanitation (1957-62)
Dr. G.D. Carlysle Thompson, Executive Officer (1958)
Don Willems, Sanitary Engineer (1957-62)
Howard Toole, Board Member, Missoula (1986)
Ed Zaidlecz, Board Member, Billings (1986)
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES
John S. Anderson, M.D. Director, (1973-74)
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Loren Bahls, Chief Water Quality Management Section,
(1983-87)
Frank Crowley, Attorney (1986)
Dr. John Drynan, Director (1983-87)
Don Holtz, Chief Air Quality Bureau (1974-74)
Abe Horpestad, Water Quality Bureau (1973-1897)
Gary Ingman, Water Quality Specialist, Clark Fork
Studies (1983-87)
Bill Opitz, Deputy Director (1986-87)
Steve Pilcher, Chief Water Quality Bureau (1979-87)
Don Willems, Chief Water Quality Bureau (1973-74),
Director Environmental Sciences Division, (1983-86)
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL
Deborah Schmidt, Executive Director (1983-87)
Hugh Zackheim, Resource Specialist, (1986-87)
OTHER AGENCIES
MISSOULA CITY/COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT
Elaine Bild, Director Environmental Health (1983-86)
James Carlson, Pollution Control Specialist (1983-87)
Kit Johnson, M.D., Director (1973-74)
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Bob Burm, Director of Engineering, Region 8 (1973-74)
Bob Fox, EPA-Water Quality Bureau liaison, (1986)
John Wardell, Director Montana
Operations Office,
(1986-87)
Frederick Kreiger, Chemical Engineer, Region 10 (197374)
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